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Abstract: Yemen is probably unique in the world, as it is a country in which the consumption of a commodity (qāt) – that 
is considered a drug, and an illegal one, elsewhere – structures the functioning of its social order, and regulates the 
quotidian existence of its population. This article explains how a plant became the singular object of commodity fetishism 
on a national scale, and how its mode of consumption came to instantiate a state-enabled social panopticon. It presents 
a comprehensive narrative that situates the endemic cultural practice of qāt consumption in Yemen within a historical 
continuum that spans nearly a century of qāt mediated state-society relations. In adopting a historically embedded 
explanation of this practice, the article provides a corrective to the intrinsically mistaken nature of the ahistorical 
interpretive framework of metropolitan travelling theories used by most social scientists – especially anthropologists – 
studying the qāt phenomenon in Yemen. Accordingly, the article retraces the historical trajectory of the gradual 
sedimentation of the qāt chewing practice into an inexorable state-qāt-society nexus as the constitutive matrix of 
Yemen’s national polity. The article elucidates how qāt consumption was used by the Yemeni state in the political 
socialization of citizens as part of its polity formation strategy. This is done through a reconstructed genealogy of the 
state mediation of qāt consumption informed simultaneously by a historical anthropology, a cultural sociology and a 
political economy of the multiple factors and ensemble of processes that contributed to the societal hegemony of this 
practice. The article offers a panoramic analysis that integrates the social, cultural, political, economic and institutional 
ramifications of qāt fetishism through a narrative of four historical conjunctures which illustrate the shifts in state policy 
vis-à-vis qāt and the capillary effects throughout Yemeni society. The article concludes with a summation of the current 
configuration of state-society relations in which qāt emblematizes a national social currency, and offers a brief menu of 
the challenges to be confronted in addressing the multiple dilemmas of Yemen’s endemic qāt chewing culture. 
Keywords: Commodity fetishism, Cultural mediation, Cultural nationalization, Drug, Panopticon, Political 
socialization, Polity formation, Qāt, State building, Yemen. 
INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIETAL HEGEMONY OF 
QᾹT 
[Commodities] play a major role as a system of 
order essential for the inculcation of habitus [1]. 
Qāt refers to the plant Catha Edulis whose mildly 
narcotic leaves contain an amphetamine-like stimulant 
which induces a state of euphoria when chewed. Qāt 
exemplifies what Appadurai has called a “commodity 
ecumene”, which encompasses a symbiotic spectrum 
of socially and historically embedded activities that 
constitute its social life as a commodity, and which 
articulates a “transcultural network of relationships 
linking [its] producers, distributors, and consumers” [2]. 
In this commodity ecumene the state has consistently 
played a mediating role through the adoption of an 
alternating set of policies that ranged from the 
antagonistic to the complicitous toward the production, 
distribution and consumption of qāt. One of Yemen’s 
pioneer social reformers, the late Muḥammad al-
Zubayrī, captures the ecumenical sway of qāt  
 
 
*Author is an Independent Scholar and Research Associate at the Yemen 
Center for Studies and Research. P.O. Box 7305, Sana’a, Yemen;  
E-mail: jds_elie@yahoo.com 
consumption over Yemeni society, when he ominously 
and prophetically declared in the 1950s that “Qāt is the 
first ruler of Yemen” [3]. Chewing qāt has since 
become the national pastime during which the 
overwhelming majority of adult (especially male and 
less so for female) Yemenis spend at least a quarter of 
their waking hours nearly every day on an ostensibly 
aimless collective conviviality. Indeed, qāt consumption 
dictates the metabolic processes of the national polity, 
and thus determines the functioning tempo of the 
national society. This is a truism lamented by Yemenis 
themselves: “Today life [in Yemen] is to a large extent 
planned by, and adapted to the use of qāt. The 
consumption of the plant controls all social functions” 
[4]. It is this capacity to regulate the metabolism of the 
nation’s body politic that makes its consumption a 
“Trojan horse of value shift” when it spreads to a new 
cultural context or among new consumers [2]. This is, 
in fact, what happened when there occurred a shift in 
the scope of qāt consumption from an “enclave” 
commodity consumed by an exclusive “original nexus” 
of consumers made up initially of a minority in tradition-
bound provincial towns, which constituted the local 
class of notables (adherents of Sufism, poets and 
wealthy merchants and landowners) among whom qāt 
consumption was an exclusive cultural practice 
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governed by ritualized etiquette, to a “mobile” 
commodity consumed by a wider range of consumers, 
which encompassed all social categories within the 
national polity motivated by a hedonistic ethos. This 
shift occurred gradually in the post-revolution period of 
Yemen’s modernization when qāt’s provincial 
“customary circuits” of production, distribution and 
consumption that was driven by a subsistence ethos 
mutated into a commercial enterprise of national scope. 
In effect, the gradual generalization of qāt 
consumption and its mutation into a mass cultural 
practice made it a propitious tool for the state’s political 
socialization of the national polity. Moreover, it has 
perdurably leashed Yemen’s urban society to the 
cultural ambit of a traditional rural world regimented by 
the political power of tribes. The politico-cultural 
geography of Yemen is configured around the primary 
regions of qāt production. This geography is 
demarcated by the political and cultural hegemony of 
one socio-geographic zone over another, which takes 
the form of a chronic regional power imbalance 
between qāt producing zones in the northern tribal 
highlands and qāt consuming zones in the southern 
lowlands and coastal regions. Hence, there persists a 
symbiosis between the qāt economy and the cultural 
primacy of rural ways of life and the political hegemony 
of tribal power: Out of the 22 provinces of Yemen, qāt 
is grown in the rural areas of 18 of them. However, 
seven provinces account for 81 per cent of the total 
national qāt production, and all of these provinces are 
located in Yemen’s tribal highlands. These provinces' 
proportion of rural population averages over 85 per 
cent, which is higher than the national average of 71 
per cent.1 This concentration of production generated a 
transfer not only of financial resources, but also of 
political power, from the urban to the rural areas. 
Consequently, it consolidated the political and 
economic power of rural/tribal forces over urban civil 
society. Ṣan‘ā’ province, which includes the seat of the 
capital, is an exemplary case as it is the most tribalized 
of all of the country’s provinces. 2 Moreover, it is first 
                                            
1 The seven provinces are: Ṣan‘ā’, al-Baydhā’, ‘Amrān, Hajjah, 
Ibb, Dhamār, and Ta‘iz. 
2 Worthy of note is the fact that Ṣan‘ā’ province has the highest 
number of registered tribal shaykhs (373) per capita (one shaykh for 
every 2,757 persons) than all other governorates. The tabular 
presentation of the distribution of tribal shaykhs for all of Yemen’s 
provinces is in a 2006 World Bank report [6]. Moreover, the city of 
among the qāt producing provinces of Yemen, and 
accounts for nearly a quarter of the country’s annual 
production. Also, it produces more qāt than the total 
production of ten provinces combined [5]. This makes 
the province of Yemen’s capital the national hub for qāt 
production, which serves as a symbolic reminder of the 
proximity of tribal economic interests to the seat of 
power. This proximity not only exercises a constraining 
effect on the state’s policy vis-à-vis qāt, but also 
conditions the political stability of the regime on not 
antagonizing tribal economic interests.  
The resulting preponderance of qāt in the rural 
economy and urban society has consolidated the 
endemic political power imbalance between the state 
and highland tribal regions, which is an exacerbating 
factor in the chronic precariousness of Yemen’s 
political stability and its dysfunctional governance. 
Moreover, this has led to the saturation of urban culture 
with rural recreational practices, as all forms of social, 
political and cultural interactions both in the private or 
public spheres now take place through the medium of 
qāt chewing sessions. In effect, qāt chewing has 
become such an all encompassing practice that it 
constitutes the sole venue for social intercourse 
throughout Yemen’s rural villages, provincial towns, 
and main urban centers. Indeed, qāt meets all the five 
characteristics associated with the societal hegemony 
of a commodity3:  
• “Ubiquitous”: qāt has the most extensive and 
effective supply chain of all other commodities, 
which blankets the entire country;  
• “Omnipresent”: it regiments the entire spectrum 
of activities associated with the polity’s daily life;  
• “Addictive”: it is the indispensable enabler of the 
nation’s private conviviality and public sociability;  
• “Self-replicating”: a new generation of 
consumers is being continuously initiated from 
early adolescence; 
                                                                          
Ṣan‘ā’ is Yemen’s largest and most lucrative qāt market with its 
estimated 13,000 qāt sellers generating annual sales revenue of 
$380 million [7]. 
3 These five characteristics are taken from Barber [8] who was 
referring to the phenomenon of “market totalism” as a political, 
cultural and economic panopticon in Western societies, and which 
approximates the role of the qāt chewing session in Yemeni society. 
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• “Omnilegitimate”: its long history has bequeathed 
a cultural inertia buttressed by the support of the 
clerical class (‘ulamā’) that precludes its moral 
condemnation.4  
Qāt’s embodiment of these characteristics on a 
national scale signifies an extreme case of commodity 
fetishism given its mediation of all interactions within 
Yemen’s polity. In view of this collective cultural 
capitulation to the qāt consumption habitus, the qāt 
chewing session has now mutated into a social 
panopticon with the national polity as its voluntary 
inmates under the shared supervision of the state and 
tribal qātlords. As such, the qāt gathering is the 
reigning meta-substitute for – and not, as the myth 
among some scholars has it, a crucial means for the 
realization of – all the activities associated with urban 
cultural enlightenment. Henceforth, the urban milieu’s 
entire repertoire of sociocultural activities is 
circumscribed to the qāt chewing session with 
regressive effects on urban cultural modernity. 
Accordingly, on a daily basis from early afternoon to 
late evening Yemen’s urban social space splinters into 
a myriad of micro enclaves of urban villagers mimicking 
the entertainment-poor lifestyle of rural hamlets. In 
effect, qāt chewing has facilitated the transplantation of 
a rural lifestyle and induced an accommodative 
disposition toward tribal influence in Yemen’s urban 
centers, which has engendered the hegemony of a 
cultural provincialism in its cities. Consequently, this 
has atrophied the development of an urbane modernity; 
and thus perdurably ruralized its urban culture as well 
as tribalized its political culture. Furthermore, this has 
generated a widely shared perception among Yemenis 
that their society is caught in what I call a post-
traditional trap, which is an arrested societal transition 
that indefinitely straddles the rural and the urban and is 
accompanied by stagnation in its cultural, institutional 
and human development. As a result, Yemen is 
currently caught within a sociocultural pendulum swing 
                                            
4 An apt exemplification is that this ‘ulamā’ would never invoke 
the word ḥarām (prohibited) vis-à-vis qāt in spite of all the widely 
recognized derelictions it has engendered throughout Yemeni 
society. Moreover, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious 
Guidance, headed by a member of this ‘ulamā’, provides no moral 
guidance in the qāt debate, and seems to have refrained from any 
symbolic gesture (e.g., uprooting qāt trees from its estates) that 
would suggest a modicum of sympathy with the public perception of 
qāt as a social problem.  
between an atavistic primordialism and a vernacular 
modernity. This incomplete integration into modernity is 
aptly captured in Peterson’s description of Yemen in 
the early 1980s, which remains valid today: “There are 
few strata in Yemeni society that remain untouched by 
‘modernization’; but… there are equally few strata that 
have been completely modernized” [9].5 The World 
Bank recently attested to the country’s partial 
institutional modernization: “Yemen’s political culture is 
a blend of ancient tribal cultures and modern political 
institutions, including informal parties and formal 
institutions of government… [T]he structure of the 
modern nation state has only marginally touched rural 
areas” [6].  
In Yemen, qāt chewing is a cultural practice that has 
a history of over half a millennium, which has conferred 
upon it a high symbolic value, and thus made it 
susceptible to being recruited as a means for the 
reproduction of social and political systems as well as a 
means for reproducing relations between persons [10]. 
Accordingly, qāt consumption was always mediated by 
the historical shifts in the state’s political priorities and 
economic exigencies. This mediating role, in effect, 
amounted to a state-managed politics of consumption, 
which extended “state authority over the social 
organization of leisure” as a means of pursuing its 
polity formation objectives [2]. The role of the state, 
however, was always opportunistic, indeed parasitic, as 
it sought to appropriate and canalize qāt’s cultural 
symbolism, and not deterministic as it could not control 
its economic operations. Moreover, qāt has become an 
indispensable commodity that mediates the political 
economy of state legitimation. Indeed, the Yemeni 
state’s perennial quest to shore up its chronic 
legitimacy deficit and precarious political stability have 
made it a policy imperative to appropriate the symbolic 
capital of the qāt chewing ritual as a legitimizing 
resource in regime maintenance. In explaining how the 
practice of qāt consumption was recruited by the state 
as a cultural means to its polity regimentation 
objectives I adopt a political economy approach [11]. 
Such an approach foregrounds the realm of economy 
                                            
5 There is a saying among urban Yemenis that captures the tribal 
subsumption of urban culture: jīnā nubanṭuluhum ‘assabūnā: “we 
came to make them wear pants, they made us wear ‘asib.” The latter 
is the dagger and belt ensemble, which is a requisite sartorial 
complement to the tribesmen persona, besides the Kalashnikov rifle 
in addition to the Toyota Landcruiser, at least for the tribal shaykh. 
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and politics within a diachronic framework spanning a 
century long historical continuum in order to elucidate 
the societal consequences of the practice of qāt 
consumption. These consequences are contingent on 
an evolving set of factors, such as the policy 
imperatives of the state according to its fiscal 
exigencies and its preferred administrative modus 
operandi, the political and economic interests of 
dominant sociocultural groups, and the local 
ramifications of regional and international events and 
actors.  
By retracing the evolution of the mediating roles 
played by the Yemeni state, and thus locating the 
consumption of qāt within a historical process, I avoid 
the pitfalls of the dominant culturalist interpretive 
approach, which has informed most recent discussions 
of qāt consumption in Yemen [12, 13, 14]. This 
approach uses a synchronic (ahistorical) descriptive 
framework that focuses exclusively on the symbolic 
significations of qāt consumption and the sociocultural 
benefits to consumers. It betrays a circular explanatory 
logic, as it focuses on the meanings that objects bear 
to explain why people consume them. Accordingly, it 
prioritizes the superstructural domain of culture and 
meanings divorced from the infrastructural domain of 
economy and politics, and thus interprets consumption 
primarily, if not exclusively, as an individually-based 
practice of choice-making, meaning appropriation and 
identity assertion, and usually in the absence of a 
serious engagement with local regime of opinions 
about, and adequate historical contextualization of, the 
society’s consumption practices. The result is an 
interpretive ethos that negates the local socio-historical 
continuum of these practices by decontextualizing their 
historical condition of possibility and interpreting their 
signification through the distorting prisms of imported 
travelling theories [15]. A notable exception is the 
recently published text by Gatter [7] that not only 
breaks with the culturalist tradition and its apologetic 
analysis of the qāt consumption culture, but more 
importantly thoroughly undermines it by providing a 
wealth of data; the previous unavailability of which 
allowed the advocates of the culturalist approach to 
maintain a skeptical demeanor vis-à-vis qāt’s negative 
societal effects. Moreover, it convincingly demonstrates 
that qāt is a social problem and not a celebration of 
identity; and thus invalidates these apologetic scholars’ 
favorite line of defense against any critique of qāt: “Qāt 
is a symptom not a cause of Yemen’s problems.” 
However, the author adopts an analytical perspective 
that establishes a facile causality between government 
decisions and donors’ whims; thus qāt politics in 
Yemen is explained exclusively “as an instrument of 
[external] rent seeking in times of economic and 
political crisis” [7]. In contrast, I show that qāt politics is 
primarily internally-driven and only occasionally 
externally-mediated. This is because the political costs 
(e.g., regime instability) of the adverse effects on the 
qāt trade outweigh the temporary, if not comparatively 
insignificant, economic benefits (e.g., development 
projects funding) derived from the external rent.  
This article presents a historical reconstruction of 
the dialectical symbiosis between state policy and qāt 
consumption in Yemen based on a critical review of the 
historical and qāt-related literature complemented by 
my experience as a long term resident scholar and 
occasional participant in the qāt chewing culture. This 
history-embedded study of qāt consumption in Yemen 
exemplifies Cassanelli’s [16] observation that “Qāt [is] 
an ideal subject for ethno-historical inquiry: for to study 
the changing economy of qāt production, trade and 
consumption is also to study the entire process of 
cultural transformation.” Accordingly, the article first 
retraces the genealogy of the state-qāt-society nexus 
through four historical periods, starting from the 
aftermath of Ottoman Turkey’s withdrawal from Yemen, 
which marks the formal independence of North Yemen 
and the embryonic construction of a modern state until 
the first decade of the twenty-first century, which 
heralds an emerging consciousness about the societal 
challenges engendered by the widespread production 
and consumption of qāt. It concludes with a summation 
of the historical narrative in terms of the current 
configuration of state-society relations in which qāt 
figures as an entrenched national social currency.  
STATE & QᾹT: GENEALOGY OF THE NATIONAL 
POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION 
All societies tend to restrict, control and channel 
exchange of commodities… in order to harness 
them into the reproduction of social and political 
systems [10]. 
Ever since the introduction of qāt in Yemen from 
Ethiopia in the fourteenth century its consumption 
acquired the stigma of a “social evil” and public 
authorities were compelled to deliberate over how best 
to contain its spread [17, 18, 19]. The concerns that 
animated these public policy deliberations over qāt 
consumption centered on whether or not its use 
conformed to Islamic moral standard, had debilitating 
effects on social behavior, engendered negative health 
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consequences, or undermined the economic solvency 
of the polity’s households. There was a chronic 
ambivalence about what to do about qāt partly due to 
the absence of clear guidance from the primary 
sources of Islamic law – the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth (the 
Prophet’s sayings) – as qāt was unknown during the 
Prophet’s time. Hence decisions relied on the arbitrary 
whims of the Islamic jurists [20]. Accordingly, the menu 
of policies alternated between reluctant tolerance, 
complicit silence, regulated distribution, and absolute 
interdiction. The determining consideration in the 
adoption of one or the other of these policies was 
whether or not it affected the fiscal health of the state’s 
treasury, or its potential for political instability due to 
social unrest by unhappy consumers and sellers. The 
first incidence of state prohibition of qāt took place in 
the sixteenth century in North Yemen under Imam 
Yaḥya Sharaf al-Dīn, which inaugurated a long saga of 
alternating state policies toward qāt [21].  
The following four sub-sections give the contours of 
this policy saga between the Yemeni state and qāt: The 
first section starts from the second and final withdrawal 
of the Turks from Yemen and the full relinquishing of 
the reins of state power to the Imam, and with it the 
authority to consolidate state formation in which qāt 
production was a crucial means of fulfilling the fiscal 
imperative of the Imamate regime. The second section 
discusses the aftermath of the 1962 Revolution, which 
marks the demise of the Imamate and the rise of a 
Republican regime in North Yemen heralding 
modernist aspirations that were ultimately sacrificed to 
end the eight year civil war. During this period the 
domestic political scene was dominated by the power 
struggle between the minority “modernists” (al-
‘asriyyun) made up of educated professionals and 
urban residents, and the majority “traditionalists” (al-
taqlīdiyyun) composed of tribal groups and religious 
conservatives, over the political and cultural orientation 
of the new republic in which qāt mediated the state’s 
political stability, if not its legitimacy, and the nation’s 
cultural identity. The third section focuses on the 
politically and culturally fraught decade following the 
unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, which 
inaugurated democratic multi-party electoral politics. 
The result of which was another civil war and the 
hegemony of tribal and Islamist forces of traditionalism. 
This led to the enthronement of qāt chewing as a 
national cultural tradition, which was one of the means 
of subordinating the newly incorporated southern polity 
through a kind of cultural assimilation within a 
modernity-averse cultural tradition, and political 
subjugation within an institutionally informal and tribe-
centric authoritarian northern political culture. Finally, 
the fourth section starts at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century when there emerged a collective realization 
that the nation was in thrall to a dysfunctional qāt 
consumption habit with ominous consequences for the 
country’s future, and the urgent quest for mitigating 
measures. 
These four periods are discussed in terms of a 
conjunctural analytical strategy, which emphasizes the 
contingency of historical context and not the inertia of a 
cultural tradition. This entails a focus on the cultural 
mediation of the state as driven by its political economy 
objectives and its alternating recourse to policy levers 
of constraints and facilitation of qāt production and 
consumption as a means of generating preferred 
outcomes in the trajectory of the national polity 
formation process. Accordingly, the analysis locates 
the production of the symbolic significations and 
societal consequences generated by the gradual 
spread of qāt chewing in Yemen within a temporally 
demarcated historical continuum that articulates the 
shifting linkages between the macro political and 
economic exigencies of the state, the meso 
institutionalization strategies of its administrative 
apparatus, and the micro socio-cultural practices of its 
consumer-citizens.  
Pre-Revolution: The Instrumentalization of Qāt 
The year 1918 signaled the end of the era of shared 
sovereignty between the Ottoman Turks and the Imam 
from the Ḥamīd al-Dīn dynasty with the Turks’ 
withdrawal from North Yemen, and the establishment 
of an independent Imamate with all of the exigencies 
associated with state-building: sustaining fiscal 
solvency, maintaining social order, and ensuring 
political stability. Achieving fiscal solvency was the 
most urgent, given that the other two exigencies 
depended on it. Accordingly, the state launched an 
aggressive and permanent quest for opportunities to 
maximize revenue generation from the public through 
the expansion and consolidation of a fiscal extraction 
regime. This was all the more crucial as Yemen lost a 
significant proportion of the revenues it earned from the 
global coffee trade by the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Yemen’s share of the global coffee trade, 
which accounted for 100 per cent at the dawn of the 
eighteenth century, had dwindled to a mere one per 
cent by the first half of the nineteenth century [22]. In 
effect, tax revenue generation was the consuming 
preoccupation of the Imamate, which seemed driven by 
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a chronic anxiety about fiscal insolvency, and that led 
to an extreme form of state parasitism: the polity’s 
fiscal exploitation. Indeed, the sole raison d’être of the 
state administrative system was tax collection as 
evidenced in the fact that over 60 per cent of state 
employees were responsible for collecting taxes [23]. 
Moreover, it was the principal tool for exercising state 
authority, building political alliance, ensuring regime 
maintenance, reinforcing the social status hierarchy 
and policing the sectarian division within the polity. The 
very structure of the taxation system was conducive to 
all of these functions. The selective distribution of tax 
farming (jibāya) privileges to elite social groups (i.e., 
Sāda, Quḏā, and major tribal shaykhs); the obligatory 
collection of the zakāt; and the economically ruinous 
mode of tax collection, tanfidh, deployed against 
recalcitrant tribal taxpayers in which a large delegation 
of soldiers and tax officials occupy a village or region 
for an indefinite period at the expense of its inhabitants 
who were obligated by customs to copiously feed their 
self-invited “guests.” Finally, the tax burden was 
unequally distributed between the two religious sects: 
the Zaydī (Shī‘a) and the Shāfi’ī (Sunnī). The latter 
contributed the bulk of the tax income, while the state 
was more selective vis-à-vis the former.  
In sum, the tax system was resented by all, 
because of the imposition of taxes that had no basis in 
Islam and the misappropriation of the taxes collected 
by the Imam for whom there was no distinction 
between the household budget and the state treasury 
[24, 25, 23]. Worthy of note is the fact that the tax 
burden was a primary source of discontent with the 
Imam’s regime, which engendered the exodus of an 
estimated one fourth of the Imamate’s population made 
up mostly of members from the Shāfi’ī merchant class 
and dispossessed farmers [26].6 Moreover, it provided 
the catalyst for the political mobilization, and induced 
the revolutionary zeal, of the foot soldiers of the Free 
Yemeni Movement in the insurrections it organized, 
                                            
6 This period was a catalyst to the emigration movement and the 
constitution of an extensive Yemeni Diaspora that made up nearly a 
quarter of the male labor force and by the mid-1970s their 
remittances accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the GDP of the YAR 
[27, 28]. These émigrés’ remittances funded the rural development 
movement through the Local Development Associations (LDAs) in 
the 1960s and provided the disposable income that enabled the 
spread of the qāt consumption culture in the 1980s. 
and that culminated in the 1962 Revolution [29, 24].7 
This predatory administrative regime vis-à-vis ordinary 
citizens was complemented by a distributive regime for 
highlands tribal shaykhs as parasitic stipendiaries of 
the state in exchange for their political loyalty and 
service as mercenary forces.8 In effect, the Imamate, in 
the post-Turkish era, formalized this stipendiary 
regime, which was previously an occasional practice. 
The result was the promotion of these tribal shaykhs 
into professional war lords who rented out the martial 
ethos of their tribes to the highest bidder. 
Subsequently, this custom of paying a regular bribe to, 
as a protection pact with, the major northern tribal 
confederations in exchange for not challenging the 
authority of the state would be consolidated (especially 
after the civil war of 1962 to 1970) into a permanent 
institutional feature of the Yemeni state to the present.  
This pivotal period of power alternation and the 
subsequent financial requirements of state-building 
provided a propitious context for the promotion of qāt 
cultivation as a lucrative revenue generation crop for 
the Imamate’s treasury, and as a substitute cash crop 
for coffee. Indeed, the Imam encouraged big 
landowners who were formerly coffee growers to shift 
to qāt in order to make up for lost income from 
declining coffee production [32, 33]. Unlike the global 
scope of Yemen’s coffee trade, the export market for 
qāt was circumscribed to the Aden Colony of the British 
Protectorate in South Yemen, or more accurately South 
Arabia. Qāt from the Imamate enjoyed a supply 
monopoly until competition from Ethiopia began in 
1949. The volume of trade with Aden provides a partial, 
but representative, illustration of the impact of the 
Imamate’s qāt production policy: In 1935 North Yemen 
exported 618,988 pounds, by 1949 it had increased to 
2,415,248 pounds [34]. The encouragement of qāt 
production was accompanied by increased taxation on 
                                            
7 The depth of the widespread resentment engendered by the 
Imamate taxation regime and the political opposition that followed is 
best expressed by one citizen of that period as follows: “now, when 
there is no Dawlah [Ottoman state], he [the Imam] presses the yoke 
very hard upon our necks, and makes us give everything to Bait’ul-
Mal [state treasury] … They [the sāda, the Imamate’s aristocracy] 
treat the people as if they were qorash (pack beasts)” [30].  
8 Indeed, the Imam himself was the beneficiary of a monthly 
stipend form the Turks that amounted to 30,000 Turkish pounds 
annually until the end of the Ottoman rule in Yemen [31]. 
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other traditional crops. This caused farmers to shift to 
qāt production, which was already more lucrative than 
other crops. The effect was to initiate an inexorable 
process of crop replacement as well as acreage 
expansion by qāt [35]. This upward trend in qāt 
production contrasted with a declining trend in coffee 
production: From 12,000 tons in the 1940s, to 5,000 
tons in the 1960s, and down to 2,000 tons in the 1970s. 
Prior to the 1962 Revolution qāt production had already 
surpassed coffee production [32]. The increasing 
economic significance of qāt heralded a number of 
significant socio-cultural shifts:  
• The demise of qāt as a contentious religious 
issue, as the religious class, who was the 
cultural arbiter of the regime became not only its 
habitual consumers but also its staunchest 
defenders, especially against its labeling as a 
“drug” (mukhaddir). By then the qāt chewing 
ritual had already displaced, if only partially, 
coffee drinking as the enabler of the quest for 
religious or creative rapture, as the euphoria 
induced by qāt – kayf, was more potent than the 
one induced by coffee – marqaḥa. This led to the 
abandonment of the state’s prior preoccupation 
with whether or not qāt consumption was ḥalāl 
(permissible) or ḥarām (prohibited), which 
required the ambivalent fatwā (opinion) of the 
fuqaha’ (Islamic jurists).  
• The domestication of the maqyal (qāt chewing 
session) as a mundane social activity in the 
Imamate’s theocratic polity led to its 
enshrinement as a customary ritual, and 
ubiquitous cultural hub for the everyday 
afternoon gatherings of adults among religious 
scholars and teachers, literary devotees, judges 
at their work stations adjudicating cases. 
Moreover, it led to the gradual dis-enclaving of 
qāt consumption from its original nexus of elite 
consumers to non-elite social categories. Indeed, 
the Imams seem to have recognized the utility of 
the qāt consumption ritual as a cultural 
bridgehead for the political socialization of its 
citizens into a demobilized polity and 
acquiescent to the inequities of its taxation 
regime – ultimately a vain expectation (see 
below).  
• The emergence of a secular debate among 
Yemenis over qāt signaled the opening of a fault 
line in cultural sensibility that straddled a pre-
modern and a modern social imaginary in the 
form of an attitudinal divide in the poetic and 
social discourse over the societal effects of qāt. 
A harbinger of this attitudinal divide is in the 
thematic shift in the poetic debates (mufākharāt) 
over the respective virtues and/or vices of qāt 
and coffee that animated the afternoon 
gatherings of urban elites while chewing qāt and 
drinking coffee in their dedicated chambers 
named mafraj or dīwān that instantiate 
“vestibules of paradise.” As Wagner [36] 
observes, “Where a pre-modern Yemeni 
[hyperbolic] partisanship for one or the other was 
most probably tongue in cheek, in the modern 
period the debate between coffee and qāt 
became deadly serious.” Henceforth the qāt tree 
“came to symbolize the tyranny and waste of the 
ancient régime”, while the coffee tree induced a 
nostalgic yearning, and thus was emblematized 
as “the nation’s historic destiny.” Indeed, in 1926 
the coffee twig and its red berries were 
enshrined as the national emblem in the center 
of the coat of arms of the flag of the Imamate, 
formally known as the Mutawakilite Kingdom of 
Yemen, and are still featured in the flag of 
today’s Republic of Yemen [7].  
This “deadly serious” tenor was to characterize a 
running dispute over qāt between different sectors of 
society, and between them and the state that has 
persisted into the twenty-first century. This tenor 
marked an epochal shift between the period prior to the 
twentieth century when the public authorities displayed 
an aloofness vis-à-vis the recreational drug use of 
private citizens – hence the public sphere was 
characterized by a laissez-faire zeitgeist; and the dawn 
of the twentieth century when the Imamate’s officials 
became active promoters of the qāt chewing practice 
as a fiscal policy measure and perhaps unwittingly as 
the polity’s social opiate while encouraging stasis in 
other societal domains. The Imam’s intentional 
underdevelopment of the society provoked the 
indignation of social reformers animated by shame-
producing invidious comparisons to a modernizing Arab 
world vis-à-vis which Yemen was still a medieval 
enclave. One contemporary observer described 
Imamate rule as having three foundations: “sectarian 
zeal, native pride, and national isolation” [30]. The 
inaugural event, at least symbolically, that conferred 
the state’s seal of approval on qāt consumption as 
North Yemen national cultural ritual could be attributed 
to the legendary poetic duel of 1922 between 
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Constantine Yanni a Turkish officer who was the 
traveling companion of Ameen Rihani the Arab-
American writer during his 1920s sojourn in Yemen, 
and Imam Yaḥya who epitomized the absolute 
primordial sovereign whose words were the law of the 
land. Constantine’s denigrating words are captured in 
this illustrative stanza: “Qāt gives no benefit at all, / 
only pain and hardship. / It annihilates the mind / and 
tires the heart and nerves.” Imam Yaḥya responded 
first by strategically invoking the indirect approval of the 
Prophet: “Qāt is admirable according to the Friends of 
the Prophet… / With it weakness fades away… / It is a 
source of energy. / Thought is sharpened to a fearful 
and burning brilliance” [17]. Rihani [30] described the 
public’s reaction to this poetic duel in rather hyperbolic 
terms as follows: “For as soon as San‘a knew that he 
himself [the Imam] had entered into the arena to 
defend ghat [qāt] everyone, even the saqiah-boy, 
began to sharpen his rusty steel. There is a tumult and 
confusion of rhyming in the city – worse than the 
confusion and tumult of the Day of Judgment.” 
The Imam’s poetic defense of qāt seemed to have 
banished any policy ambivalence toward it, if only 
during the Imamate period. However, Imam Yahya and 
his successor son Ahmad did not expect that qāt 
sessions could eventually be used to hatch plots 
against their regime, as qāt consumption was thought 
to be conducive to a sedately contemplative, if not an 
intoxicated, polity and thus politically indifferent to the 
affairs of state.9 This double edge nature of qāt, in 
                                            
9 Contrary to such expectations, the qāt session could be an 
incubator of a collective shift in social sensibility, which induced 
aspirations for societal transformation, as was the case in the early 
literary salons of the Imamate’s social elites who gathered to read 
clandestinely the literature of the Arab Awakening forbidden by the 
Imam. Douglas [24] described one such gathering in the 1930s: 
“Typically these scholars would spend four or five hours a day 
smoking the madā‘a (water pipe) and chewing qāt while discussing 
such books by contemporary Arab authors as they could obtain.” 
This kind of subversive gathering animated by qāt was reproduced in 
the South under British rule [7]. Also, in the immediate aftermath of 
unification in 1990, the qāt chewing session became the central site 
for political organizing in preparation for the Parliamentary elections 
of 1993 (see below). However, by the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, the qāt session had been drained of its conspiratorial cachet 
and subversive potential and mutated into a prosaic ritual devoid of 
any revolutionary symbolic significance. In this light, Wedeen’s [13] 
historically uninformed assertion that today’s qāt session is the site of 
emancipatory politics betrays a romantic interpretation that is patently 
terms of its unintended consequences, was to plague 
its use by the Yemeni state as a political socialization 
tool. The first half of the twentieth century constituted 
the catalytic period during which all of the initial steps 
regarding the production, distribution and consumption 
of qāt that were to become national trends in the future 
were first taken: Crop replacement, acreage expansion, 
popularization of its consumption, the rural economy’s 
dependence on its cultivation, and the shift from 
subsistence to commercial production. 
Post-Revolution: Reactive Symbolic Valorization 
This was a seminal period in Yemeni history 
encompassing nearly three decades (1962-90), as it 
began with a revolution, which would finally, it was 
hoped, allow Yemen’s entry into the modern world. 
This period was the legacy of a long simmering 
aspiration for collective social emancipation. This 
aspiration encouraged the formulation of many grand 
national covenants (e.g., the “Sacred National Pact” of 
1947, and “Our Hopes and Aspirations” of 1955), which 
in turn motivated a number of failed revolutions to 
redeem North Yemen from its medieval isolation. It 
gave birth, however, to the Free Yemeni Movement 
that would ultimately carry out the Revolution of 1962 
[24]. The Revolution inaugurated a modernization 
experiment whose trajectory can be divided into 
phases that represent a series of birth pangs of the 
new state – the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) – that 
ultimately produced a national institutional structure in 
which qāt was enshrined as a commoditized social 
broker. It was an agonistic process that unfolded 
through three critical phases in state-building and polity 
formation whose cumulative impact was the 
consolidation of the economic, cultural and political 
primacy of qāt in North Yemen’s national life.  
First Phase (1962-1970): Civil War Unleashed 
This period saw the country dragged through the 
ordeal of an eight year civil war between the new 
Republican/revolutionary forces and the 
Royalist/counter-revolutionary forces, which 
simultaneously enacted a proxy war between Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia promoting two divergent visions for 
the Arabian Peninsula: A modernist Pan-Arab future 
versus a traditionalist Pan-Islamic past. The civil war 
was a catalyst to the propagation of qāt, which is 
                                                                          
anachronistic. 
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illustrated in the following three effects:  
First, it monetized the rural economy as never 
before through the massive influx of cash from external 
parties supporting different sides of the civil war, which 
extended the stipendiary regime previously reserved 
for tribal shaykhs to ordinary tribesmen. The Prime 
Minister at the time noted that “Yemenis, who prior to 
the Revolution, had worked their fields and paid their 
zakāt, became accustomed, during the Revolution, not 
having to work, yet still get paid!” [37]. This cash flow 
had the effect of stimulating the demand for qāt as well 
as its supply. Qāt became an indispensable accessory 
for the tribesmen soldiers, which led to the expansion 
of its cultivation as well as the intensification of its use 
among the rural population.  
Second, qāt production began to acquire the status 
of a providential crop, given its pivotal role in the 
transition from a largely subsistence agriculture to a 
commercial one. The latter was abetted not only by war 
subsidies and their enhanced consumption effects, but 
also by the embryonic development activities (e.g., 
roads building, agricultural investments, etc) funded by 
startup Local Development Associations (LDAs) and 
foreign aid. These initiatives improved access to 
markets and incentivized qāt production. The result 
was that by 1969, qāt production made up nearly 16 
per cent of the YAR’s total GDP [32]. This had the 
effect of increasing the economic stake in qāt and of 
consolidating the political clout of the tribal shaykhs in 
the mountainous highlands where it was cultivated.  
Third, the civil war ended in a relative stalemate, 
which neutralized the modernist aspirations of the 
revolution. Indeed, “the price for ending the civil war 
was the official rejection of many of the proclaimed 
revolutionary goals and means” [38]. As the Saudi 
Arabia brokered “capitulationist peace” agreement (the 
Jeddah Pact) of March 1970 guaranteed the 
representational parity, if not primacy, of the counter-
revolutionary forces in all of the institutions of the state 
[37, 39]. While the agreement affirmed the principle of 
national unity, it authorized the practice of regional 
autonomy. In effect, it promoted a minimalist 
conception of national unity, which institutionalized the 
regional and military autonomy of the northern tribal 
formations into the “land of insolence” toward the state, 
and empowered them to promote a traditionalist vision 
of state and society relations that privileged primordial 
socio-political organization (i.e., tribalism) at the 
expense of urban civil society.  
The cumulative end result of the above was a 
chronic condition of “aborted state-building” [23], as it 
eventually led to the consecration of tribes as the 
primary, if not sole, means available to the Yemeni 
state initially to establish, and subsequently to sustain, 
the local administration of a polity that was and still is 
overwhelmingly rural. Consequently, this tribalization 
imperative circumscribed the revolution to merely a 
change of political elite at the helm of the state without 
the structural transformation of society. Moreover, the 
state policy choices consolidated the traditional social 
structure to the detriment of the emergence of a new 
one with the 1970 constitutional ban on the formation of 
political parties; therefore preventing the mobilization of 
an urban-based civil society that could counter the 
hegemony of tribes in the political system during the 
seminal years of state formation in North Yemen. In 
effect, state policy privileged primordial affiliations 
based on tribes and regions, and emphasized the co-
optation of their most influential individual 
representatives, to whom was bestowed the 
prerogative of controlling and mobilizing their particular 
constituencies on behalf of the state. Accordingly, tribal 
shaykhs were delegated responsibility for ensuring 
their tribes’ political loyalty to the state in return for 
material and other benefits as part of a patronage 
system that sought to prevent the emergence of 
challengers to the regime. The subsequent 
institutionalization of tribes as indispensable national 
power brokers is partly due to this initial political 
configuration of state-society relations established 
during this period, and its distortive effects on the 
state’s political culture are still being felt in the present. 
Finally, another legacy of this phase was the increasing 
dependency of these tribal formations’ economy on qāt 
production that was to become as important, if not 
more so, as their reliance on the state’s stipendiary 
regime. This new dependency would diversify their 
function as tribal shaykhs in the nation-state: From 
warlords to power brokers, and subsequently qātlords.  
Second Phase (1971-1977): Modernization Re-
launched 
This phase inaugurated the YAR’s opening to the 
world as well as attracted the world’s interest in the 
country. For the new state’s modernizing technocratic 
leaders – who perceived qāt consumption and tribal 
politics as developmentally obstructive sociocultural 
legacies of the Imamate – this moment presented a 
window of opportunity to re-launch the modernization 
process that was interrupted by the civil war. This was 
to be pursued through a normative reorientation of the 
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state’s institutional practices and the nation’s political 
culture: From a pre-modern tradition-bound, rural-
centric, tribally configured civic base controlled by tribal 
shaykhs; to a modernity aspiring project of societal 
transformation that was urban-led with a civil society-
centric constituency managed by a government of 
technocrats.10 The economy of that period was based 
mainly on the influx of two exogenous sources of 
financial flows: Foreign aid, and labor remittances. 
The first source, foreign aid, constituted “the entire 
current budget of the Yemeni government between 
1973 and 1983” [23]. It sponsored a plethora of 
international agencies and their agents as purveyors of 
international norms-diffusing “development” regime, 
which arbitrated the YAR’s incorporation into the global 
economy. They were instrumental in establishing the 
country’s institutional infrastructure for modern 
statecraft. Among the contingent of expatriate 
personnel that accompanied these agencies (UN, 
USAID, etc) was a pioneering group of foreign scholars 
– mostly anthropologists pursuing doctoral fieldwork – 
who would succeed the previous cohort of Orientalist 
travelers. Their intellectual sensibility predisposed them 
as defenders of traditional cultural practices, which was 
diametrically opposed not only to their eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Orientalist predecessors, but also to 
modernist Yemeni intellectuals and technocrats.11 The 
                                            
10 The struggle to implement this project, which was ultimately 
unsuccessful, is insightfully chronicled in the memoir of Muḥsin Al-
‘Aynī [37] who occupied the post of Prime Minister three times during 
this period.  
11 The cumulative impact of their scholarly efforts has 
bequeathed a tradition of social science discourse that is entrapped 
in an essentializing interpretive matrix, which asserts that Yemen is 
irremediably caught within an immutable historical process. This is 
due, according to these scholars, to the endemic constraints of a 
landscape in thrall to a geographic determinism and the inexorable 
pulls of the past [40, 41]. Consequently, historical contingencies are 
either not considered or misconstrued through the use of 
anachronistic theories such as segmentary theory that posits 
tribalism as an ontological fatality for the Middle East as a whole (see 
[42]). The persistence of this interpretive disposition has vitiated the 
scholarly understanding of the historical and contemporary dynamics 
of Yemeni society. This is exemplified in the consensual view that 
tribalism is a millennia old institution that is endemic to Yemeni 
society and which continues to operate not only in its original form 
(i.e., guided by customary law), but also to maintain its autonomy 
from the state. In fact, its continued existence is due to the politically 
lasting result was the constitution of two opposing 
community of interpreters with divergent interpretive 
standpoints: A foreign adulatory predisposition versus a 
local condemnatory stance vis-à-vis the collective 
consequences of the qāt chewing habit. This period 
heralded greater scrutiny of qāt use in Yemen by 
international agencies through sponsored studies 
regarding its sociocultural functions, societal effects, 
developmental ramifications, addictive impact, and 
whether or not it should be considered a drug to be 
banned.12 In contrast, foreign anthropologists assumed 
the position of enthusiastic defenders of qāt chewing, 
which one of them described as “one of their own most 
important cultural practices” [14]. 
The second and most important source, labor 
remittances, coincided with the oil boom in Saudi 
Arabia, which attracted over one-third of Yemen’s labor 
force [23]. Their remittances became the pillar of the 
rural economy as they ushered in an era of “second 
hand prosperity” in Yemen. This led to changes in 
socio-organizational structures, and in agricultural 
practices: First, the spread of LDAs and their self-
reliant development schemes in social infrastructure 
                                                                          
engineered absence of the state from the rural hinterland through the 
series of historical conjunctures driven by externally imposed and/or 
internally generated political exigencies as discussed above.  
12 Worthy of note, is that the Arab League of Nations through its 
specialized organ the International Arab Narcotics Bureau (IANB) 
has been trying to wean Yemen from its qāt habit since the 1950s. 
This led the Arab League to designate qāt as a narcotic in November 
1956. In the same year the Muftī of Saudi Arabia promulgated a 
fatwā prohibiting the cultivation, trade, and consumption of qāt. The 
fatwā was the first attempt to uproot qāt in the two ethnically Yemeni 
provinces of ‘Asīr and Najrān in the southwest of Saudi Arabia, which 
it annexed in the 1930s. Subsequently, in August of 1971, the fatwā 
was affirmed by a Royal Decree making the ban on all qāt-related 
activities the law of the land. The menu of punishment was 
excessively severe, but not successfully dissuasive, as qāt is still 
available in Saudi Arabia today: seventy-nine lashes (one less than 
adultery), five years of imprisonment, a fine of SR13,500 ($3,000), 
and permanent expulsion from the country after the prison term [44]. 
The timing was not accidental, as the ban was declared after the civil 
war ended; thus qāt was no longer needed to sustain the martial 
fervor of the Royalist tribal army they were supporting. More 
importantly, the influx of Yemeni migrants was becoming an 
important component of Saudi Arabia’s labor force, and it did not 
want any politico-cultural contamination of its polity.  
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construction (e.g., access roads, water supply) in the 
rural sector was the prime vector of socio-
organizational change, as they substituted the state as 
development agency as well as marginalized the tribal 
shaykh as mediator between state and community. By 
1977 the development budget of the LDAs was $113 
million compared to the central government budget of 
$194 million [27]. Second, these remittances afforded 
the mechanization of agricultural production through 
the purchase of equipment for drilling wells and the 
procurement of diesel pumps for irrigation. The impact 
on qāt production was to transform it from a rain-
dependent seasonal harvesting to a water pump-
irrigated perennial production, and the impact on 
consumption was its mutation from a regionally 
restricted and socially occasional indulgence to a 
countrywide and habitual consumption practice. By 
1974, the production of qāt contributed 34 per cent to 
the country’s total GDP, which was double the figure of 
five years ago [32]. 
While the increasing production of qāt may have 
been good for the north’s national economy, it was 
presenting a challenge to Yemen’s modernization from 
the perspective of the government at the time. 
Accordingly, on May 20, 1972 the Yemeni government 
took its first comprehensive public policy initiative 
against qāt in the post-civil war period. The timing of 
the decision seemed to have been coincidental, as it 
was inspired by the positive response of the audience 
to an impromptu talk given by the modernist Prime 
Minister, Muḥsin al-‘Aynī, during the closing session of 
a conference on administrative reform. The decree that 
was announced subsequently called for the following 
actions: (a) “Government employees and the armed 
forces are prohibited from chewing qat”; (b) “Qat shall 
not be cultivated on government and Endowment 
property”; (c) “Assistance will be withheld from regions 
continuing to cultivate qat”; and (d) “Public awareness 
campaigns shall be carried out to urge the public… to 
stop chewing qat, particularly in public places” [37]. The 
official daily newspaper Al-Thawra [43] praised the 
decision as a “blessed and courageous step to heal the 
[nation’s] wound by eliminating this malicious plant that 
has become a disaster for the Yemeni people… and 
has been the main reason for the terrible 
backwardness we are suffering from.” The Prime 
Minister’s own assessment of the impact of the decree 
was upbeat: “The favorable response by the general 
public to the anti-qat measures exceeded our 
expectations… the qat-swelled cheeks disappeared 
from the streets and public places.” However the effect 
was short-lived, as he explained: “the government that 
succeeded ours didn’t give the subject any attention… 
it even encouraged people to return to qat.” There were 
oppositions to this decree, as al-‘Aynī reported that “a 
number of big qat farmers” met with him to raise their 
concerns about the decree undermining their business 
and reputation, and requested him “not to suggest in 
the media that chewing qat is religiously prohibited” 
[37]. Nevertheless, the religious establishment was 
incensed at the decision and manifested its anger by 
symbolically destroying a lorry-load of bottles of 
alcoholic beverage, and thus forcing the government to 
terminate, if only temporarily, its importation [20].  
This policy decision, which seemed to have been 
taken on the spur of the moment, has given rise to a 
cottage industry among post facto interpreters of the 
incident as epitomizing Yemen’s modernist leaders’ 
depth of cultural alienation and social 
disconnectedness, and especially their intellectual 
subservience to external donors’ policy dictates. The 
still prevalent assumption of these interpretations is 
that al-‘Aynī’s removal from office was due to the anti-
qāt decree, which is based on a plausibility-challenged 
historical reconstruction by some scholars as self-
appointed defenders of local customs, and who 
seemed intent on gratuitously impugning these leaders’ 
motivation as crass opportunism. In doing so, they 
betray their condescending view of Yemenis as not 
being ready for modernity-aspiring leaders. One of 
these scholars erroneously asserted: “his measures 
were vigorously opposed by political leaders in 
producing areas, which contributed to his fall from 
power in 1972” [14]. Another called the decision an 
“opportunistic crusade” that resulted in a “political 
debacle”, as the Prime Minister “was turned out of 
office three months after beginning his anti-qat efforts” 
[17]. More than a generation later al-‘Aynī’s decision is 
dusted off from the archives to substantiate a theory 
(“rentier state”) that misconstrues the political economy 
of qāt. This theory hypothesizes that the Yemeni state’s 
qāt politics was always driven by opportunistic rent-
seeking from external donors. Accordingly, he is 
critiqued in an accusatory language: “al-‘Aynī had no 
genuine interest for reform regarding qāt and that his 
campaign was rather a short-term crisis management 
aiming at raising Arab funding than a domestic long-
term strategy intending to rid Yemen of the drug” [7]. 
These mistaken views aside, the real reason for al-
‘Aynī’s resignation from office, however, was due to 
“the rabid campaigns against the Unity Agreement” 
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with South Yemen, which he negotiated in Cairo in 
October 1972, under the pretext that the accord 
mentioned the role of non-governmental organizations. 
The latter was viewed by the military and tribal shaykhs 
as a source of “political partisanship” – a euphemism 
for their implacable opposition to civil society 
participation in politics – which was prohibited in the 
1970 constitution.13 
After the resignation of al-‘Aynī there was a relative 
abandonment of negative public pronouncements on 
qāt. Instead, his successors resorted to the tactical use 
of qāt in pursuit of their political objectives. This phase 
ended with a last-ditch attempt to rekindle the dying 
embers of the modernist promises of the Revolution, 
which prioritized policies that were aimed at sundering 
the intrinsic qāt-tribalism nexus in order to engineer the 
demise of the political hegemony of tribes over the 
state and society. This recuperative attempt was 
initiated through the June 1974 coup d’état by populist 
army officer Ībrāhīm al-Ḥamdī, who was, and still is, 
considered by many Yemenis as the Atatürk manqué of 
Yemen, given his credentials as “a strong nationalist 
with modernist views” with a zealous commitment to 
state building and socioeconomic development [45]. 
Indeed, “al-Ḥamdī made the first and final attempt to 
establish the central state as an independent force in 
the Yemen Arab Republic”, by endeavoring “to 
centralize power, to strengthen the formal army, and to 
                                            
13 To set the record straight the Prime Minister (PM) resigned in 
the last week of December 1972, a full seven months after the anti-
qāt decree, and was back again as PM in June 1974 under President 
al-Hamdī. Chapter seven of his memoir gives a detailed account of 
the context of his decision on qāt, and of the events leading to his 
resignation. Also, Stookey [26] had already cited the same reason for 
al-‘Aynī’s resignation. However, al-‘Aynī does have a history of being 
forced out of office for having taken unpopular decisions. A 
noteworthy incident was his forced resignation within three weeks of 
the decision to discontinue the tribal stipendiary regime taken in 
February 2, 1971 [37]. He balked at the imperious demands of the 
tribal shaykhs, which not only included the reinstatement of the 
stipends but also the extension of their authority over the government 
(see the shaykhs’ memorandum on page 208 [37]). “Any Imam, a 
thousand years ago, would have rejected such demands”, he 
exclaimed upon submitting his resignation. At the time tribal stipends 
exceeded the tax receipts of the government: nearly 40 million riyals 
were allocated to tribes, while the government collected taxes (zakāt) 
were less than 11 million riyals [26]. Tribal stipends were one of the 
principal sources of the YAR’s chronic budget deficit.  
mobilize workers, peasants, and farmers against the 
tribal confederations” [23]. Al-Ḥamdī sought to 
capitalize on the LDAs’ provision of basic rural services 
as a means of establishing the state’s institutional 
hegemony and its political legitimacy [25]. This goal 
was to be accomplished through three policy initiatives 
enacted in 1975: (a) the authorization of LDAs to 
collect and use local taxes on community development, 
thus by-passing traditional local authority structures; (b) 
the allocation of the proceeds from the sales tax on qāt 
as additional revenue source to enhance the work of 
the LDAs, while simultaneously bestowing recognition 
on qāt’s contribution to rural development and indirectly 
encouraging its cultivation; and (c) the suspension of 
tribal subsidies as a means of freeing the state from the 
financial parasitism of the northern tribes and shifting 
its resources to the development of a non-tribal civil 
society as a counter-availing power base [23, 25].  
This modernization experiment was aborted with the 
assassination of al-Ḥamdī in October 1977, which 
brought to an end the precarious balancing act 
between modernists’ genuine desire to present Yemen 
as a modernizing country onto the international stage, 
while trying to appease traditionalists’ interests [9]. The 
end result was the lasting demise of the modernization 
project, and the inexorable traditionalization of society 
through the opportunistic use of qāt and the expedient 
pandering to tribes as epitomized in the next phase. 
This mode of use was illustrated by al-Ḥamdī’s 
immediate successor, Ᾱḥmad al-Ghashmī a qātlord 
himself, who in spite of his brief tenure of eight months 
as President managed to establish a legacy as the 
inventor of the qaṭal, which is a plastic bag of plucked 
qāt leaves that replaced the cumbersome meter-long 
bunch of branches with qāt leaves, and as the 
originator of the practice of free distribution of these 
qaṭal to soldiers to co-opt their allegiance [7]. The latter 
practice was followed by his successor who extended 
the distribution to the civilian population as a social 
currency to induce and reward government allegiance 
[46]. 
Third Phase (1978-1990): Traditionalization 
Ascendant 
These twelve years led to the irreversible 
mainstreaming of qāt in Yemen’s economy and society. 
The political leader of that period, ‘Alī ‘Abdāllaḥ Ṣāliḥ 
(1978-2012), seemed to have learned one political 
lesson from his predecessors’ fate (i.e., coup d’état and 
exile, or assassination) that was to ensure his near 
dynastic hold on power: “If a regime… is to survive, the 
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values of each significant element in the society must 
be at least partially consistent with the values and aims 
of the leader” [26]. The governance ramification of this 
lesson was to lead to the sedimentation of “inertial 
forces” that would relegate the country into a post-
traditional trap, which was pursued as follows: “Rather 
than force a transformation of the [traditionalist] 
periphery to conform to the modernist centre, the 
outlook of the centre… [was made] to encompass 
many of the goals and values of the periphery” [38]. 
This period was a determining one in Yemen’s history, 
as it consolidated a mode of governance, where the 
periphery captured the center, which was called 
“Republican tribalism” [39]. This governance modality 
was the cumulative effects of policy decisions 
necessitated by the political exigencies in the aftermath 
of the revolution, which empowered the tribes as the 
state’s primary constituency, as discussed in the 
previous phases. Accordingly, tribes were promoted as 
self-organizing communities in a kind of selective 
decentralization of power through the establishment of 
a vertical relationship between the state and regional 
tribal fiefdoms. Moreover, the regular payment of bribes 
(i.e., the stipendiary regime) to the powerful heads of 
these tribal fiefdoms became a sacrosanct institution. 
These practices have limited the state’s accountability 
to elite corporate groups, circumscribed its territorial 
managerial responsibility, and ultimately transformed 
the country into a libertarian dystopia.14 In such a 
context qāt provided the cohesive element as social 
currency in a geographically dispersed, regionally 
diverse, and minimally integrated polity.  
During this period, the predominance of the 
periphery in the government’s policy focus was due not 
only to the demographic majority of the rural population 
and their shaykhs’ political clout, but also to the 
economically disproportionate importance of the 
                                            
14 The legacy of this period was the permanent integration of 
tribes within a state sponsored territorial administration system that 
approximates the workings of a libertarian anarchy: The state 
concedes authority to tribal shaykhs over regional fiefdoms while it 
foments competition between them. In this way, these potential 
political contenders for state power are too preoccupied with 
ensuring the security of their tribal fiefdoms to challenge the center. 
However, when the center can no longer contain the periphery as 
happened in the aftermath of Yemen’s Arab Spring in 2011, the 
result is the takeover of the state by a regional tribal militia, which 
occurred in 2014.  
continuing influx of remittances from rural émigrés. In 
1982, these remittances amounted to $1,018 billion, 
which partially financed the import of goods valued at 
$1,096 billion, with the customs duty on these imports 
constituting the government’s principal revenue source. 
In contrast, export of locally produced goods amounted 
to a paltry $5 million [47]. Relatedly, the labor shortage 
engendered by the continued exodus of migrants from 
the rural sector led to a collapse of agricultural 
production, which occasioned substantial crop 
substitution from labor intensive and minimally 
remunerative cereal crops to qāt as a commercially 
lucrative crop with low labor requirement. 
Consequently, the area under grain cultivation declined 
by 68 per cent: From 1,197 million hectares in 1975 to 
812 thousand hectares in 1980 [48]; while qāt 
cultivation grew by 52 per cent: From 43,000 hectares 
in 1972 to over 83,000 hectares in 1981 [17]. 
Henceforth, qāt production became the pillar of the 
rural economy as the value of its production in 1982 
was estimated at $1,100 billion, and constituted 52 per 
cent of the added value of the agricultural sector [49]. 
As a result, by the end of the 1980s qāt had become a 
mass consumption phenomenon, and thus was 
inextricably anchored as a cultural practice in the daily 
lives of the population; henceforth qāt consumption 
mutated from a leisure activity to a social necessity. 
Also, the mass influx of remittances engendered the 
financial autonomy of the nation’s overwhelmingly rural 
population from the state. This further consolidated the 
political sovereignty, and institutional independence, of 
the community development movement (the LDAs), 
which indirectly challenged the state’s political 
legitimacy, as attempts to co-opt it under the al-Ḥamdī 
regime failed. This is the background to the emergence 
of Ṣāliḥ's regime maintenance and state legitimization 
strategy, which had three pillars:  
The first pillar was the legal mainstreaming of qāt 
through the adoption of a series protection and 
promotion policy measures during the 1980s: The 
enactment of Law No. 14 in 1980, which (a) reduced 
the tax rate on qāt from 30 to 10 per cent as a political 
peace offering to tribal/rural interests; (b) officialized 
the status of the qāt seller (muqawwit) with a permit 
that recognized a previously denigrated occupation as 
a respectable profession symbolizing its retroactive 
rehabilitation into Yemen’s millennial occupational 
structure; and (c) sought to organize the anarchic 
trading of qāt in urban centers by establishing qāt 
markets outside city centers with controlled prices 
policed by market supervisors and tax collectors. More 
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significant was the enactment of Law No. 40 in 1981, 
the “Plant Quarantine Law”, which was an indirect ban 
on the importation of qāt from East Africa, especially 
Ethiopia, and thus the protection of Yemeni qāt 
producers against foreign competition. Tellingly, coffee 
never received such protection. These legal measures 
were complemented by the aggressive implementation 
of an undeclared information policy which enforced the 
state complicit silence on qāt in collusion with its major 
producers. Consequently, state media outlets were 
prohibited from negative reporting on qāt; state officials 
engaged in a systematic defense of qāt vis-à-vis 
external critiques through a reflexive denial of any 
negative impact on society; and state agencies 
engaged in haphazard collection of statistics on qāt 
that were inadequately reported in Yemen’s statistical 
yearbooks.15 
 The second was the institutionalization of state 
control through the organizational cooptation of the 
non-tribal population’s political autonomy and 
incorporating them as the regime’s popular civic base. 
Three major political initiatives were launched by the 
government as part of an intensive mass political 
mobilization offensive that would ensure the regime’s 
political stability: The formulation of the “National Pact” 
in 1980 as an extra constitutional framework within 
which a “National Dialogue” was pursued in quest of a 
regime-friendly consensus among the entire spectrum 
of political orientations. This was followed by the 
establishment of the “General People’s Congress” 
(GPC) in 1982 as a state-sponsored party-like political 
organization that denied the label (because of the 
constitution’s ban on party formation), but whose aim 
was to formally incorporate the interests and “values of 
each significant element of the society.” Finally, and 
more crucially, the government enacted a series of 
laws and decrees in 1985 that co-opted the “civic 
activism” of the LDAs by merging them with local 
administration into “Local Council for Cooperative 
                                            
15 It is only in the late 1990s that the Central Statistical 
Organization began to systematically collect statistics on qāt 
regarding acreage, production and yield, which were made available 
in the annual statistical yearbooks. However, since 1970 data were 
available but reported in “bundles”, which made it impossible to 
accurately evaluate total production [51]. Nevertheless, the method 
currently used to update annual statistics on qāt remains a mystery, 
as it seems to be based on a statistical formula and not on field data 
collection.  
Development.” In effect, this transformed an 
autonomous community cooperative movement into a 
“corporatist project of the state” [15]. While these 
initiatives resulted in the entrapment of the body politic, 
they could not harness the general will. The latter was 
to be achieved through the state’s promotion of the 
culture of qāt consumption, as it deemed the qāt 
chewing ritual the cement of national cohesion. 
Therefore, the collective participation of the polity in a 
common ritual activity would inexorably lead to a 
symbiotic identification between state and nation, which 
was the focus of the third pillar.  
 The third, and most important, pillar was the 
deployment of a politics of cultural authentification 
through the construction of a post-revolution national 
self-conception that would link qāt consumption with 
national identity, regime sustainability and state 
legitimacy. The 1980s signaled the full domestication of 
qāt consumption as a tool of national politics in North 
Yemen. During this period the qāt consumption ritual 
was institutionalized as a cultural imperative, which 
engendered a symbiosis between national identity and 
traditional identity. The end result was the consolidation 
of a national identity that was rooted in a provincial 
traditionalism in thrall to tribal customs, social 
conservatism, and a preference for a religious 
discourse over a secular one in education, which 
obviated the need, if not curtailed the desire, to 
participate in modernity, at least, by the rural 
population. The latter appropriated the material comfort 
modernity afforded, but not the socio-cultural 
transformations it entailed.16 According to one Yemeni 
scholar the promotion of the qāt chewing ritual was, in 
effect, the continuation of the Imamate’s policy of 
national cultural isolation from modernity; as he puts it, 
“the culture of qāt consumption tends to reproduce the 
model of traditional society. Those who associate qāt 
with national identity solely want to defend traditional 
identity” [51]. In the urban centers, this tendency 
resulted in the cultural domination of the qāt chewing 
session as the hegemonic institution of leisure and the 
                                            
16 Rushby [50] captures, anecdotally, a paradoxical truth about 
qāt through an exemplification of its conservative effect in the rural 
sector: “The qat had brought sufficient wealth to ensure complete 
stasis: girls would never be educated because farmers’ wives do not 
need education. They married at twelve years and were 
grandmothers before thirty… Here qat kept the land alive, the 
terraces in repair and the villages full.” 
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“focal point of life”, and its substitution effects stymied 
the development of modern social sensibilities and 
atrophied the repertoire of urbane cultural activities.  
The most symbolically significant event in the 
state’s politics of cultural authentification was the 
inauguration by the Presidential Office in the early 
1980s of “Ramadhan Nights” (umsiyat ramadhaniyya) 
as a mass ceremony of qāt chewing. The government’s 
rationale was that it would portray a nation with “a 
strong democratic tradition of free and open 
communication between the top and the base”, which 
the neighboring monarchies lacked and envied. These 
ceremonial “nights” brought together the political 
leadership and the people at all levels of government, 
starting with the President and cabinet members 
meeting in Ṣan‘ā’ with representatives of public 
institutions, civil society organizations, among others, 
to discuss issues of public concern in qāt chewing 
sessions. This was replicated in all other governorates 
and districts led by governors and district directors and 
where qāt was distributed free of charge to the 
participating public [46]. The launching of this “tradition” 
was in reaction to the patent cultural hostility of 
Yemen’s neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, which 
induced a collective feeling of a national identity under 
siege. This hostility was epitomized in Saudi Arabia’s 
machinations to have the Islamic umma confirm that 
qāt was a prohibited drug through a decision by the 
“Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Countries” 
held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in March 1982 [46].17 This 
attempt represented an escalation in the Saudi state’s 
continuing “culture war” against Yemen’s qāt habit, as it 
followed the 1956 regional ban by the members of the 
Arab League, with an international ban by all Muslim 
majority countries. 
 The Yemeni government response to this latest 
                                            
17 Yemen’s religious establishment rose to qāt’s defense in a 
letter dated 8 June 1982 to the Saudi government signed by the Muftī 
of the Republic along with eleven other religious leaders questioning 
the basis of their decision. The letter stated in part: “Claims against 
qāt have gone west and east until they have captivated some minds 
leading them into prohibiting qāt… without communicating with 
Yemeni scholars to take the truth from its source as those scholars 
are the ones who lived with qāt since its entry into Yemen… 
Therefore, we as religious leaders responsible for commanding the 
right and forbidding the wrong and clarifying the truth we decide and 
issue a ruling that qāt is permissible (ḥalāl)” [44].  
slap by its chronic meddler of a neighbor was to 
engage in a reactive symbolic valorization of qāt 
consumption as a patriotic practice and thus to defend 
it as emblematic of a distinctive Yemeni identity and 
enlisted the public to show its support. In contrast to 
some foreign scholars’ claim that the adoption of qāt 
chewing as a national cultural identity-asserting ritual 
was a culturally preservationist reaction to Western-
induced rapid social change or to Western-inspired 
local elite’s anti-qāt policy [12, 14], al-Saqqāf attributed 
the principal cause to the cultural antagonism of a 
regional neighbor: “Saudi Arabia, in prohibiting qāt 
consumption… helped propagate the idea that qāt was 
an element of national identity” [52]. The state found a 
willing partner in a population awash with disposable 
income from remittances, and eager to engage in the 
ostentatious consumption of qāt as a vicarious 
enactment of the returning émigré’s prodigal complex. 
This state-sponsored national identity branding 
campaign achieved a measure of national cultural self-
determination vis-à-vis its neighbors through a 
consumption ritual that bonded state and society. This 
modus operandum of the state in which qāt chewing 
was a symbol of the north’s national identity and a 
means of political mobilization was deployed as an 
incorporation strategy vis-à-vis the south. 
Unification: Cultural Nationalization 
The decade of the 1990s brought major upheavals 
in Yemeni history and society. The long quest for the 
unification of the country was finally achieved on 22 
May 1990; but inauspicious international events 
complemented by local ones were to quickly mar this 
promising event. The first salvo that would embroil the 
newly constituted Republic of Yemen in a diplomatic 
crisis with multiple ramifications occurred within a week 
of its unification: on May 28, Saddam Hussein accused 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of “economic 
warfare” against Iraq because they raised their oil 
production quota. This pretext eventually led to Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2. Yemen, which 
happened to be a rotating member of the UN Security 
Council at the time, adopted a posture of chronic 
abstention vis-à-vis the resolutions seeking to have 
Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. This posture enraged the 
Gulf countries, which led them to expel an estimated 
800,000 Yemenis migrants mostly from Saudi Arabia, 
and the termination of all economic assistance to 
Yemen [53]. Beside the tragedy of this forced 
repatriation of dispossessed Yemenis to a country that 
could not accommodate them, one of the 
consequences was the immediate cessation of the 
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influx of remittances, which made up 39 per cent of the 
average income of a rural farm family [27]. Making up 
this shortfall explains, at least in part, the pro-qāt policy 
regime that was pursued during this decade, which 
sought to extend qāt farming partly as an employment 
generation scheme for the returnees, given its pull 
effects on the agricultural, trade, and transportation 
sectors. Some of the qāt-related national ramifications 
of these events are highlighted below: 
First, the adoption of pro-qāt agricultural policies, 
which led to the government’s enactment of the 
following measures: (a) lifting the total ban on qāt 
cultivation and the partial ban on qāt consumption in 
the south that was imposed by the former southern 
state, which led to the intensification of qāt farming in 
formerly minor growing regions of the south (e.g., Laḥij, 
Shabwa, and Abyan) as well as to the diffusion of the 
qāt chewing habit to formerly non-consuming 
population (e.g., Ḥadhramawt, al-Mahra, and Soqotra) 
[54]; (b) subsidizing diesel fuel, which 
disproportionately benefitted qāt farmers as it 
minimized the cost of irrigation; (c) providing tax 
exemptions for the import, and subsidized loans for the 
purchase, of well drilling and water pumping equipment 
in order to incentivize the expansion and intensification 
of qāt cultivation throughout the national territory; (d) 
maintaining an import ban on qāt from Ethiopia, which 
is cheaper than Yemeni varieties; (e) practicing a 
chronic bias in agricultural extension services toward 
irrigated areas, which is where qāt farms are 
concentrated; and (f) allocating import concessions for 
fertilizers and pesticides, which are indispensable for 
commercial qāt production [51, 7]. The end result was 
the transformation of the agricultural sector into a qāt-
led, if not a qāt-dependent, economy. This is evident in 
the significant contribution of qāt production to the 
national economy from 1990 to 2000: It employed 
nearly 25 per cent of the agricultural labor force, and 
made up 14 per cent of the total employment in the 
national economy; it contributed 33 per cent of the 
agricultural GDP, and 7 per cent of the national GDP; it 
averaged 54 per cent of the contribution of oil 
production to the economy during the decade; and it 
occupied 9 per cent of the total land area under 
cultivation [51]. The intensification of qāt production 
was partly an attempt to substitute for the loss of 
remittances and to create employment opportunities for 
the returnees. 
Second, the official sanctioning of the use of qāt as 
a social currency in the public sector occurred during a 
period of intense political ferment, as the ban on the 
formation of political parties in effect since 1970 was 
finally lifted in 1990. This led to intense competition 
between the nation’s mosaic of political parties. As a 
result, political organizing in public forums was 
ubiquitous especially in view of the upcoming 
parliamentary elections of 1993, which were crucial to 
determining the fate of unification. This context was 
propitious to the colonizing effect of qāt, as all forms, 
as well as the timing, of private and public gatherings 
for political deliberations were transformed into 
afternoon qāt chewing sessions in both north and 
south. While this qāt animated political activism was 
taking place in civil society, the state launched its own 
integration process of the formerly divided public 
bureaucracies of North and South Yemen, which 
entailed mainstreaming the personnel into a work ethic 
in which qāt was the pillar of the incentive structure, 
and organizing the work schedule around the afternoon 
qāt chew. Accordingly, a series of measures were 
taken to make qāt consumption an integral part of 
government work: (a) allowing qāt chewing in 
government offices, which was prohibited back in 1971 
(although the prohibition lapsed, it was not officially 
affirmed); (b) allocating recreational rooms for qāt 
chewing in government buildings became a standard 
feature as prayer rooms; and (c) introducing in the 
public budget a category for qāt expenses, the 
“sessions’ stipend” (badal jalasāt), to be paid out for 
government work carried out in the afternoon, which 
instituted a pecuniary ethos of incentive-seeking in the 
civil service with corrupting effect on the work ethic [46] 
(see below).  
Third, the consolidation of qāt-mediated institutional 
practices that shifted the substantive and strategic work 
of government outside the premises of public 
institutions to the afternoon qāt session held in the 
private homes of high government officials with 
selective participants and beyond public scrutiny and 
accountability. These sessions became the actual loci 
of government decision-making among elite groups, in 
parallel to the weekly Ministerial cabinet meeting. In 
effect, the generalized recourse to this practice of 
privatizing the locus of government decision-making 
sundered state institutions into uncoordinated private 
fiefdoms. This practice has informalized the institutional 
authority of the state and personalized the power of its 
office holders; thereby de-institutionalizing the state 
and weakening its regulatory capacity and enforcement 
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credibility.18 Moreover, this institutional displacement of 
government work was complemented by the 
consolidation of a political culture of clientelist 
governance through a regime of “opportunistic 
patronage” (al-īntahāziyya al-‘aṣbawiyya), which was 
initiated in the third phase of the previous period but 
confined to elite groups, was now extended to the 
general public. The end result was the proliferation of 
clientelist practices as normal means of accessing 
public goods based on a supplicant relational protocol, 
(i.e., favor-seeking and bestowing) between citizens, 
and bureaucrats in government institutions. 
Fourth, the promotion of a culture of qāt 
consumption among the public administration 
personnel that inexorably led to a qāt-induced corrupt 
administrative ethos as an intended policy effect. This 
corrupt ethos permeated the entire administrative 
apparatus of the state and was replicated throughout 
society via the proliferation of venal mechanisms of 
mediation.19 In the case of lower rank personnel, the 
dependency-inducing effect of regular qāt consumption 
reduced them into a venal corps exacting petty bribes 
                                            
18 This chronic weakening of the state’s formal administrative 
institutions that began after the civil war by default has since become 
by design, and has permanently disabled its administrative 
capacities. This is confirmed in the 2014 report of the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), which ranked Yemen 119 out 
of 129 countries in terms of the state’s managerial capacities. To 
illustrate the depth of the Yemeni state capacity deficits a few figures 
will suffice. On a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best) Yemen scored on a 
number of key aspects as follows: Basic administration 3, 
implementation capacity 3, power to govern 2, social capital 2, and 
state identity 4. The 2012 report highlighted the presence of parallel 
governance structures in the observation “that the public 
distinguishes between ‘the government’ (al-hukuma) and ‘the power’ 
(as-sulta)” (see website: http://www.bti-project.org).  
19The public sector seems to operate on the basis of the wāsta 
system (colloquially referred to as “fitamin waw”), which, in effect, is a 
meritocracy prevention mechanism. It entails the obligatory 
intercession of a socio-politically connected third party (a political 
philanthropist) to enhance the chances, usually unmerited, on behalf 
of an acquaintance who is petitioning the state for a public good. This 
is complemented by an endemic baghshīsh syndrome among 
government staff: This refers to a generalized system of petty bribes 
seeking, taking and giving, in which government service delivery 
entails a conditional quid pro quo involving cash payments to civil 
servants to meet their daily qāt requirement [51, 7]. 
from the public to feed their habit. In the case of high 
government officials, the holding of rather lavish qāt 
sessions became an obligatory ritual as a normal part 
of the networking, decision-making and power-
exercising functions of governance. This engendered 
the practice of casually skimming off a hospitality 
honorarium from government budgets. In effect, the 
state’s actions created the perception among the public 
at large that there was an inextricable symbiosis 
between the culture of qāt consumption and the 
pervasive culture of corruption, if only of low-end bribe-
taking and high-end petty embezzlement, in the public 
sector; thereby discouraging virtuous behavior among 
public servants, corroding the moral content of 
government action, fraying the ethical seams of the 
nation, and thus contaminating the value framework of 
the public sphere. Indeed, it is eminently plausible to 
argue that the spread of this qāt-mediated culture of 
governance was among the significant catalysts to the 
civil war in 1994 between the two recently unified 
states. The leaders of the former southern state 
seemed to have realized the impossibility of ever 
bridging the incompatibilities between two divergent 
administrative traditions: A system of “northern 
anarchy” (al-fawḍā al-shimālī) characterized by a state 
bureaucracy that is merely a patronage distribution 
mechanism devoid of any developmental compass, 
which selectively co-opted the society’s elites on a 
rotating basis contingent on the political urgency of the 
moment; and a “southern order” (al-nidhām al-janūbī) 
based on formal state institutions, and centralized 
planning in pursuit of societal order and development, 
with an ideology-driven and disciplinarian party 
organization as center of power [55]. 
Fifth, the deployment of qāt as a socio-cultural 
engineering tool for the cultural subsumption of the 
former southern state as part of the north politics of 
incorporation, if not “annexation” as some scholars 
have suggested [52, 56]. This led to the conflation of 
northern cultural practices with the national polity 
through a dual process of cultural imposition and 
voluntary adoption in places in the south where qāt 
cultivation and consumption were unknown. Indeed, in 
those places in the south where qāt was an imported 
commodity the practice of qāt chewing was merely a 
leisure activity that was disassociated from any notion 
of cultural identity, and was more likely to be perceived 
as a means of cultural pollution, if not domination [54]. 
The diffusion of qāt consumption throughout the south 
may have been initially welcomed, especially in ‘Aden, 
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as a symbolic rejection of the former regime’s 
restrictions on individual leisure activities, but in other 
regions of the south it engendered an animosity-
inducing acculturation into a northern tribal identity as a 
pan-Yemeni identity, erasing regional particularities, 
and the reification of qāt consumption as the pillar of a 
national culture. As al-Saqqāf [52] noted, unification 
was a political opportunity for the “renewal and 
expansion of traditionalism” throughout the national 
territory.  
However, it was a detumescent traditionalism that 
was being promoted, as it was corrupted by the system 
of opportunistic patronage that led to the proliferation of 
arbitrarily selected shaykhs, who, lacking local 
legitimacy, exercised authority through the threat of 
violence. Emblematic of this decayed traditionalism is 
the demise of Ṣan‘ā’ as a sanctuary (hijrah) since pre-
Islamic times, where tribal conflicts were not allowed 
[20]. Dresch’s observation in the early 1990s offers an 
illustrative anecdote: “Not long ago, Ṣana‘ā’ was still 
seen as makhzan al-ru’ūs, that is the place one went in 
order to escape tribal feuding and ‘preserve one’s 
head’; now it is seen by many as more dangerous than 
the country-side” [57]. More importantly, what 
happened in the south as a whole, but in ‘Aden in 
particular given its cosmopolitan character and 
culturally liberal environment, was to prefigure the 
afflictions of the traditionalization of the unified national 
society after the civil war of 1994: (a) the de-
cosmopolitanization of the urban milieu through the 
prohibition of modern forms of entertainment, as 
evidenced in the closure of cinemas, bars, and the 
promotion of qāt chewing as the hegemonic leisure 
activity; (b) the Islamization of the public sphere 
through the segregation of the sexes, the enforcement 
of Islamic dress code for women, and the abrogation of 
liberal laws concerning women’s rights; and (c) the re-
tribalization of the southern polity through the re-
instatement of the tribal shaykh as the dominant 
communal authority figure and institution [7]. 
In sum, the culture of qāt consumption and its 
multiple venues and functions in the unified polity can 
be subsumed under two umbrella ideal types of qāt 
sessions: One is the “conviviality session”: in which 
ordinary citizens engage in a talk fest as part of a 
quotidian socializing practice that provides a 
momentary exit from life’s chronic disappointments in 
an opportunity-deficient society, and offers a venue to 
voice their political grievances and ideals as well as 
their socio-economic frustrations and aspirations. For 
the most part, the nature of the social interactions in 
those sessions is best characterized as “building 
castles of spit”: that is engaging in animated chatter 
about unrealistic plans inspired by the qāt’s euphoric 
effects that are never pursued beyond the chewing 
session [58]. The multiplication of this type of sessions 
throughout the national territory engendered on the one 
hand, a kind of local cultural disaffiliation among new 
inductees into the qāt chewing culture, and on the other 
a kind of regional cultural disaffection among those 
who rejected it as a cultural invasion. Both instances 
are evident in places where qāt was previously 
unknown [54]. The other is the “power session” in 
which the government leadership and exclusively male 
elite corporate groups engage in bargaining, or more 
aptly caballing, toward maximizing their appropriation 
of the nation’s resources and wealth for their 
enrichment or power aggrandizement. The exclusive 
nature of this type of session, given its centrality in 
state decision-making process, has engendered the 
socio-economic disenfranchisement of non-elite groups 
and the political marginalization of some regions of the 
country, especially in the south, given their exclusion 
from such sessions. Finally, the state-mediated 
nationalization of the qāt consumption culture has 
exacerbated the tendency toward the national polity’s 
regional fracturing, and thus the erosion of its national 
cohesion. 
New Millennium: The National Reckoning 
By the dawn of the twenty-first century qāt 
consumption was widely recognized as a national 
social malaise by habitual consumers and non-
consumers alike; given the chronic social dependency 
on its daily use by the majority of the adult population in 
spite of its widespread perception as a time-wasting, 
habit-forming and financially-draining practice. Indeed, 
by then the qāt chewing ritual had completely shed its 
tradition-bound sociability to incarnate an unanchored 
hedonistic conviviality; and had already sedimented 
into a cultural inertia inextricably entrenched in the daily 
habits of Yemenis that was beyond suppression or 
delegitimation [59]. Also, the polity had evolved beyond 
the state-sponsored national affirmation of qāt chewing 
as an authentically Yemeni cultural patrimony in 
reaction to the petro-dollar induced condescending 
gaze of their Arabian Peninsula neighbors. In effect, 
Yemen’s polity had already surrendered to the ritual of 
mass temporary hibernation to engage in the 
compulsive consumption of qāt as a mundane act, and 
was resigned to endure the daily existential dilemmas 
of consumers: For example, the constant agonizing 
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over the allocation of one’s income to the family’s 
welfare or to a hedonistic indulgence; the chronic 
wallowing in an existential incapacity to take control 
over, and assume responsibility for, one’s life choices; 
or ultimately surrendering to a qāt-induced existential 
cul-de-sac. Indeed, the qāt chewing session had lost its 
dual use potential: Its earlier vocation as an assembly 
of political dissenters engaged in preparatory lexis 
(discussion) that was followed by praxis (common 
action) in the public sphere, had mutated into a venue 
for the mere pursuit of a “regime of pleasure” that 
disabled the political agency of ordinary citizen-
participants, and circumscribed their political activism, if 
any, within the walls of the dīwān. Indeed, the latter 
played the role of a social refuge for the verbal release 
of political frustration, especially among urban youths, 
with the depredations of the autocratic regime.  
This period heralded the dawning of a collective 
anxiety about the nation’s future, given Yemen’s 
relative stagnation vis-à-vis an ever modernizing world. 
Indeed, the general observation that “Drug use has… 
historically operated as an impediment to upward 
mobility”, not only in the case of an individual drug 
abuser, but also in the case of a psychoactive 
substance-dependent national polity [59], seems 
applicable to Yemen. Paradoxically, the catalytic event 
of that period regarding qāt policy was not related to 
some macro politico-economic exigency compelling the 
state to action. In fact, by this period the revenue 
imperative of the state had already shifted from an 
accrued fiscal dependency on the direct taxation of the 
population during the Imamate, to a situation of relative 
fiscal autonomy from the population in the Republican 
era due initially to the influx of exogenous capital flows 
– labor remittances and foreign aid – and subsequently 
to internally generated oil rent due to the discovery of 
oil in Mārib in 1984 and in Hadhramawt in 1992 (and 
gas rent as of October 2009 with the first export 
shipment of natural gas). Instead, and more 
intriguingly, it was a startling public declaration in May 
of the last year of the twentieth century made by the 
former President (‘Alī ‘Abdāllaḥ Ṣāliḥ) that he was 
abandoning qāt chewing in favor of more constructive 
cultural activities, and would from then on engage in 
the takhzin (meaning “storage”, which is the word use 
for qāt chewing) of knowledge as in English learning 
and computer training as well as taking up sports. 
Perhaps the timing of the announcement was not a 
coincidence, as it occurred only four months prior to the 
first Presidential elections in unified Yemen in 
September of 1999. In effect, the announcement 
provided an attractive campaign issue vis-à-vis 
modernity-aspiring youths and progressives. Moreover, 
it was an ephemeral but successful gambit – given the 
national and international media exposure it received – 
to change the national political conversation, at least 
for a while, and to generate international attention to 
Yemen’s emerging image as a modern nation. This 
enabled the former President to claim, deludingly to be 
sure, the mantle of pioneer of Yemen’s modernization.  
This quixotic attempt to inspire his fellow citizens to 
follow his example20 contained an implicit 
acknowledgement that qāt was an obstacle both to self 
enlightenment and to the country’s development, which 
was the first negative assessment by the head of state 
since the anti-qāt policy of Prime Minister al-‘Aynī in 
1972. The former President’s change of heart was in 
effect a profession of culpability for having misled the 
nation into a qāt-mediated quest for a national identity, 
which turned the state into an advertising agency for 
tribal economic interests, by promoting qāt 
consumption as the social opiate of the national polity. 
Consequently, the twenty-first century began with a 
gesture of contrition by the state for having encouraged 
the polity to abuse qāt.21 What prompted the former 
head of state to make such an announcement at this 
particular moment? One school of thought suggests 
that it was an act of cynical opportunism induced by the 
need for, and pending promise of, donor funding. 
Accordingly, the timing was attributed to the price of oil 
having plunged to $10 per barrel in 1998, thus forcing 
                                            
20 It seems that Ṣāliḥ did not sustain his own pledge, as the 
former speaker of Yemen’s parliament, the late Shaykh ‘Abdāllaḥ al- 
Ᾱḥmar, declared to a foreign reporter: “The president preaches what 
he doesn’t practice. After all those fine words, he’s still chewing khat” 
[60]. 
21 Green [61] has offered a culturally-neutral criterion by which to 
define “abuse”, and which is beyond contestation: “habitual use 
disproportionate to income.” By this measure most Yemeni chewers 
are abusers, as 24 percent of household income is allocated to qāt 
expenditures among the 70 per cent of the adult population who 
chew qāt, which includes a high proportion of the 51 per cent who 
are below the poverty line [62]. Paradoxically, the latter group spends 
nearly 40 percent of its income on qāt, while higher income 
categories spend on average 12 per cent [7]. The average monthly 
expenditure on qāt consumption is estimated at 30,000 Rials 
(approx. US$150), which exceeds the average monthly income of a 
majority of Yemenis. 
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the government to look for budgetary gap filling 
external financing. As one scholar explains, “Ṣāliḥ’s 
anti-qāt policy was nothing more but a short-lived 
window dressing for the international community to 
attract funding” [7].22 This view ascribes a jejune 
gullibility on the part of donors and assumes an 
extreme naïveté on the part of the former President; 
and more importantly it rests on an implausible premise 
that a change in government policy on qāt could 
generate significant external rent to compensate for the 
policy’s adverse political and economic effects.  
In contrast, his announcement could more plausibly 
be viewed as a product of a capricious mode of 
decision-making and its erratic cycle of openness and 
closure toward certain issues and groups, which is 
symptomatic of the “northern anarchy” culture of 
governance, and its chronic disconnect between 
adopted policies and their implementation. Hence, the 
former President’s announcement was a piece of 
Machiavellian political theater since the state having 
accomplished its political socialization objective could 
be magnanimous with its mea culpa, and without 
having to worry about inciting the opposition of qātlords 
given the population’s fatal qāt dependency. More 
importantly, he was perhaps assured that the endemic 
structural impediments of the state’s bureaucracy – 
which his regime was instrumental in fostering – would 
prevent effective action on qāt; given that the primary 
function of the state administrative apparatus is 
patronage distribution, and not the implementation of 
development-promoting policy decisions. 
 Nevertheless, his declaration represented a breach 
in the state’s duplicitous discourse on qāt, which 
concealed a chronic policy disjuncture within the 
government between the political priorities of the 
executive branch and the policy concerns of the line 
                                            
22 Yet the author’s invocation of rent-seeking motives is 
contradicted by his account of a massive anti-qāt campaign carried 
out by a local NGO, the “National Association for Confronting the 
Harms of Qāt”, during the months of April and May 1999 prior to the 
Presidential elections that gained national attention and was widely 
discussed in the media. As Gatter [7] explains: “The sheer extent of 
the campaign and the positive resonance it received on the streets 
and among international donor community in Yemen forced the 
government to comment and act on it.” In this context, the former 
President’s announcement seemed motivated more by vote-seeking 
than rent-seeking. 
ministries: While the former was proclaiming to the 
world that qāt chewing was the most distinctive feature 
of Yemeni culture and the pillar of its national identity, 
thus a “cultural heritage” deserving of state protection; 
the latter was observing qāt’s increasing adverse 
effects on the nation’s environmental resources, food 
security, health status, and socio-economic potential, 
without being given the green light to address them. 
Intriguingly, soon after his electoral triumph in 
September with 96.3 per cent of the votes, he issued a 
number of executive orders on qāt: (a) prohibiting all 
armed forces personnel and police from chewing qāt 
while performing their duties or in official uniforms, 
which was extended to all government workers and 
premises in January 2000; and (b) extending official 
government working hours from 1 to 3 PM, in order to 
reduce the amount of time available to government 
staff for chewing qāt, which was accompanied by the 
establishment of a two-day week-end (Thursday and 
Friday) to compensate for the longer working hours [46, 
7]. One of the unintended effects of the announcement 
was the lifting of the undeclared ban on the 
government media from reporting on qāt.  
Furthermore, this announcement opened a window 
of opportunity – that would be closed and re-opened 
intermittently in subsequent years depending on the 
political exigency of the moment or Presidential whim – 
to engage in the long-delayed assessment of the 
multiple societal consequences of what was officially 
designated in a politically neutral language, “the qāt 
phenomenon” (dhāhirat al-qāt), and not, more 
accurately, “the qāt problem.” This lexical choice 
sought to avoid offending the sensibility of the religious 
establishment or to jeopardize the economic interests 
of tribal qātlords. This acknowledgement of a qāt 
phenomenon occasioned a flurry of policy activism by 
the government’s technocrats as they sought to 
remedy the state’s chronic neglect of qāt’ societal 
challenges. Henceforth, qāt was to be included (usually 
as a social problem and development impediment) in 
all major policy documents: the UN Millennium 
Development Goals, the Five Year Plan, and the 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper [7]. The 
most significant marker of this policy activism was a 
Ministerial Decree issued by the Cabinet in July of 
1999 instructing the Ministry of Planning and 
Development and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation to lead the preparations for a “National 
Conference on Qāt.”  
Such a conference was not what Ṣāliḥ had 
envisioned when he made his public abjuration of qāt, 
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given his keen awareness that the regime’s stability is 
contingent on not challenging the primacy of the tribal 
qātlords within the rural economy, or depriving their 
dependent multitude of qāt consumers throughout the 
society. Therefore, the idea of a qāt conference was 
well beyond his comfort zone, something that Cabinet 
ministers were fully aware of, hence the litany of 
reassuring caveats that accompanied its preparation. In 
the minutes of the first meeting between donors and 
the Ministry of Planning and Development held in July 
1999, the caveat was expressed in the view, “that the 
approach to qat should not be pro or against. It should 
be a rational approach to avoid tensions” [63]. This was 
the defining tenor that would infuse all aspects of the 
conference. The flurry of activities that followed this 
meeting involved donor agencies, civil society 
organizations, and government entities, and was led by 
the World Bank partly because of government 
implementation capacity deficit. The first major task 
was to fill the knowledge gap regarding the multiple 
impacts from the production and consumption of qāt in 
all sectors of Yemeni society. This was to be pursued 
through a number of government-commissioned, and 
World Bank-funded, field studies that would provide 
“objective analysis and practical advice… without 
taking a position on whether qāt is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for 
Yemen or Yemenis”, while acknowledging that “it is 
impractical to talk of eradicating it or even of reducing 
consumption significantly, at least in the short term” 
[64]. 
The conference was held nearly three years later in 
April of 2002 “to discuss problems and solutions, and 
thereby help develop a national policy and action plan 
on qāt based on the recommendations of the 
conference.” The published proceedings of the 
conference represent a substantive compendium of 
information on the “qāt phenomenon” in terms of its 
impact on health, environment, water, agricultural 
production, rural economy, culture, and Yemeni society 
as a whole. The papers were prepared by Yemeni 
researchers, and thus symbolized a national verdict on 
the impacts of qāt on Yemen and Yemenis, and their 
conclusions – despite the prescribed due diligence to 
the discursive proscriptions noted above – did not 
engender contrived positive assessments of qāt’ 
societal consequences. [64]. In effect, these Yemeni 
scholars’ fact-based pessimistic perception of the role 
of qāt in their society confirms the interpretive 
disjuncture, I discussed earlier, with their foreign 
scholars’ imported sensibility-inspired positive 
appreciation of the role of qāt in Yemen.23 In this light, 
foreign scholars’ abandonment of their pro-qāt 
sensibility seems overdue, as it appears complicit with 
an Orientalist gaze: that is, foreign observers’ preferred 
exoticist interpretations are substituted for local actors’ 
assessment of the consequences of their own 
practices. More importantly, this gaze authorizes an 
interpretive licentiousness that misrepresents a social 
problem as a cultural celebration and even as a means 
to political emancipation. This misrepresentation not 
only violates scholarly standards of intellectual integrity, 
but also exemplifies an ethically delinquent 
interpretation.  
This necessary digression aside, the 
recommendations emanating from the qāt conference 
were transformed into Ministerial Decrees that sought 
to engender a new social environment that would be 
conducive to “creativity, work and development.” The 
first decree urged the public bureaucracy to exert all 
administrative effort to ensure that all of the 
recommendations issued by the conference are 
implemented. The nature of the decrees betrays a 
meticulous attempt at avoiding controversy, and also 
they reflect a policy impasse given their similar 
contents to previous decrees that were repeatedly 
enacted throughout the preceding two decades: 
Transformation of public parks into sports venues for 
youths, monitoring the importation of chemical 
fertilizers, prevention of qāt use in government 
buildings, media awareness campaign for the public, 
and educational awareness campaign for students (see 
list of decrees in [7]). Alas, none of the decrees was 
implemented. It should be noted, however, that the 
chronic ineffectiveness of qāt policy is not due to the 
duplicity of line ministries’ officials trying to hoodwink 
donors into parting with some funds, as one scholar 
flippantly expressed it: “Qāt politics are generally short-
lived and tossed overboard once the revenue situation 
improves” [65]. Instead, the reality is that the public 
bureaucracy is functionally incapacitated and politically 
disabled, and therefore does not have the policy levers 
to confront the enablers of the “qāt phenomenon”, 
                                            
23 Alas, this foreign sensibility-induced positive appreciation of 
qāt persists, as demonstrated by one of the reviewers. While 
conceding the veracity of my arguments, the reviewer still insists that 
“the blanket assertions about qāt’s current social and political role are 
very questionable and one could easily argue the opposite.”  
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namely the qātlords lobby.24 The latter represents the 
greatest obstacle to any anti-qāt campaign. As a result, 
the promulgation of decrees to mitigate the negative 
impacts of qāt amounts to trying to extinguish a 
volcano with a bucket of water. 
Addressing the qāt problem is currently, but not 
necessarily permanently, beyond the state’s reach, as 
it has become not only politically impossible due to the 
high stakes of powerful qātlords, but also economically 
impractical given that qāt production is the engine of 
employment and revenue generation for the rural 
economy. As a result, government action betrays a 
mood of resignation, as it is confined to the perfunctory 
enactment of prohibitive decrees without the 
institutional capacity and political leverage to 
implement them. These deficiencies have engendered 
a chronic dependency on donors for policy formulation 
and on funding its implementation [7]. These donors, in 
turn, have sub-contracted responsibility for 
implementation of policy initiatives to civil society 
organizations, at their own risks, as they undertake 
awareness raising campaigns about the ill effects of qāt 
in schools among the new generation. In this way the 
state avoids the veto power of, as well as any direct 
confrontation with, the qātlords lobby. 
CONCLUSION: A POLITY WITHOUT QᾹT 
Qāt is nice, but there is nothing worse than it 25 
                                            
24 The qātlords’ lobby is composed of the following groups with a 
stake in the qāt economy: urban-based major businessmen, 
members of Parliament, high government officials, some high-
ranking military officers, and the most powerful tribal families. Gatter 
[7] refers to this group interchangeably as the “qāt lobby”, the “qāt 
oligarchy” constituting a “qāt regime” (nidhām al-qāt), and Destremau 
[32] suggested that they were a “qāt mafia” comparable to Latin 
America’s narcotic cartels. Moreover, they are part of the 9 per cent 
of landlords who own 65 per cent of Yemen’s cultivated land area 
and produce 64 per cent of the country’s total qāt production [7]. For 
this lobby, qāt is a capitalist venture with significant investments in 
large estates in the northern highland provinces, and about 
expanding holdings and maximizing profit margins. In contrast, the 
average qāt farmer would welcome any alternative crop as long as it 
is equally remunerative as qāt, and thus allows him to earn his 
livelihood.  
25 This Yemeni proverb (in Arabic: Al-qāt tayyib, mā akhrah min-
hā), quoted in [20], captures the endemic ambivalence that is intrinsic 
to the qāt chewing culture. 
The above narrative of the imbricated evolution of 
qāt consumption and national polity formation has left 
an enduring legacy: namely, the metastasis of the qāt 
chewing ritual into every facet of the Yemeni nation-
state and the corollary circumscription of the nation’s 
sense of possibility to abject expectations of the future. 
This is due to the cumulative impacts of a litany of 
deleterious effects either caused or exacerbated by 
qāt: The rural economy’s increasing mono-crop 
dependency, the urban culture’s atrophied repertoire, 
the youths’ limited aspirational horizon, the 
communities’ weaponization of conflict resolution over 
land and water, the national institutions’ credibility 
scarcity, the public sector’s ethical deficit, the civil 
society’s dependence on pecuniary incentives, the 
country’s environmental resource depletion, the 
population’s food insecurity, the urban labor force’s 
compromised work ethic, the mutation of the society’s 
political and economic elite into a cabalistic posse, the 
nation’s endemic under-achievement, the people’s 
existential cul-de-sac, and thus Yemen’s development 
impasse and modernization’s death knell.26  
Indeed, it is as if the country had lapsed into a 
pathological societal condition characterized by an 
advance state of national apathy (notwithstanding 
Yemen’s Arab Spring) as an ontological fatality. 
Yemen’s Minister of Culture described this situation as 
a disease: The “problem of qat corrupts the minds of 
the Yemeni people. It affected our progress… By 
overcoming this disease we rescue the Yemeni people 
from shame and deterioration… [and] add national 
glory to the 21st century, carrying upon our shoulders 
the motto: No qat, no negativeness” [7]. This litany of 
qāt-mediated negatives afflicting Yemen’s body politic 
is entirely homemade and not externally imposed. This 
locally made aspect of the qāt problem complicates the 
finding of a solution because of the absence of a 
foreign scapegoat that would galvanize a national 
response as in the case of the Saudis’ ban on qāt. This 
also explains the schizophrenic attitude of Yemenis 
                                            
26 All of these negative effects were mentioned in the local press 
as well as in various studies on qāt. There are positive effects to qāt, 
but they mostly relate to some aspects of the rural economy: For 
example, it incentivizes the protection of agricultural terraces from 
erosion and the expansion and maintenance of rural roads network; 
contributes toward the absorption of the rural labor force through 
remunerative job opportunities, thereby mitigating the rural-urban 
rate of migration. 
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who routinely confess to the veracity of the above litany 
among themselves, but would categorically deny them 
to outsiders; to do otherwise would be a public act of 
self-recrimination – a cultural taboo. If qāt was a foreign 
import it would have engendered by now a national 
cultural backlash, as it would be seen as a conspiracy-
laden commodity that promotes national subjugation to 
foreign interests in the manner that the British-
sponsored opium trade was seen by Chinese 
authorities back in the nineteenth century. 
The above narrative has shown that the state was a 
crucial enabler of the spread of the culture of qāt 
chewing, and that its role was determined by locally 
engendered imperatives: The pre-revolution period was 
characterized by a fiscal imperative due to the decline 
of revenues from the coffee trade and the need for 
financial resources for state-building, and qāt offered 
an alternative source of tax revenue generation; the 
post-revolution period engendered a political legitimacy 
imperative for the new republic, which was momentarily 
achieved through the symbolic association of qāt and 
national identity; the unification period generated a 
cultural nationalization imperative that facilitated the 
production, and encouraged the consumption, of qāt as 
a means of politically incorporating and culturally 
subjugating the south under northern hegemony; and 
finally, the dawn of the twenty-first century heralded a 
consumerist ethos in which the state played a collusive 
role with the qātlords lobby leading the national polity 
into a “limbic turn” for whom qāt chewing had become a 
hedonistic indulgence, thereby encouraging a pleasure-
seeking consumer identity with its private concerns at 
the expense of a civic identity with its public concerns 
[8]. This articulation of the state’s instrumentalization of 
qāt with its political socialization and polity formation 
strategy necessitates a reconsideration of the 
conventional political analysis of the nature of the 
Yemeni state, and of the dominant cultural analysis of 
the meaning of qāt chewing.  
The nature of the Yemeni state and its role vis-à-vis 
qāt has only recently been elaborated by Gatter [7] who 
invokes the conventional idiom associated with states 
in the Arabian Peninsula, namely “rentier state”, to 
explain the political and economic motives 
underpinning the state leadership’s use of qāt as a 
“strategic commodity” in sustaining the regime’s 
political stability. The problem with this approach is that 
the formal definition of a rentier state is when a country 
relies primarily for its sources of income on 
predominantly externally derived rent, usually from the 
export of hydrocarbon and/or mineral resources, and 
that such a rent accrues exclusively to the state and 
not to individuals [66]. However, this definition is not 
applicable to qāt, which is mostly a locally traded 
commodity, cultivated by private individuals, whom the 
state does not control, and who in fact constrain the 
state to prioritize their interests through what I have 
been calling the qātlords lobby. Accordingly, the rentier 
state cannot explain the Yemeni state qāt policy. 
Furthermore, the rent that could be acquired through a 
quid pro quo with donors could never compensate the 
qātlords economic losses, or prevent the resulting 
threat to the regime’s stability. This is because qāt 
neither constitutes a strategic commodity for the 
outside world, nor poses an existential threat to any 
other society but Yemen’s. Hence the scale of 
resources that anti-qāt campaigns could ever muster 
would pale in comparison with the rents that have 
accrued to the Yemeni state via its self-serving 
participation in the “war on terror”, which the West 
perceives as an existential risk to its own societies 
through exportable acts of terror.  
Instead what does exist in Yemen is a “rentier 
mentalité” that is partly qāt-induced or qāt-exacerbated. 
The term refers to a societal condition in which 
“individuals [including the society’s socio-political elite] 
live without having to commit themselves to any strict 
‘work ethic’, nor does any distinction need to be made 
between income ‘received’ and income ‘earned’.” This 
is complemented by an “easy come, easy go” attitude 
that informs both the individual’s use of his income and 
the state’s allocation of the public purse [66]. This is the 
mentalité that underpins state-society relations in 
Yemen in which qāt is the facilitating social currency. 
This rentier mentalité is institutionalized within, what I 
call, a cabalistic state: The latter is organized around 
informal power networks operating in a para-
institutional enclave in which elites – devoid of any 
commitment to the common good – negotiate deals 
and take state-related decisions, which systematically 
override the formal institutional channels of the public 
bureaucracy. The state’s most strategic institutions are 
controlled by the executive branch through political 
nepotism, and the society’s various influential groups 
are co-opted by the central government through the 
practice of economic cronyism. In addition, the state 
foments a qāt-mediated venal polity as its self-
reproduction mechanism through elite exemplification 
of self-indulgent and irresponsible behavior given their 
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use of the state as a public means to private ends and 
thus inducing citizens to appreciate corruption, if not as 
the preferred means to social mobility, then at least as 
a means of financing their qāt dependency. This is 
complemented by a “redistributionist populism” in the 
form of a generalized patronage distribution system 
through state institutions that seeks not only to literally 
purchase the loyalty of all potential political 
challengers, but also to convert as many citizens-voters 
as possible into wards of the state.27 In such a political 
context, the qāt chewing session is best seen as a 
sociocultural panopticon in which participants as 
consumer-citizens wallow in a state of resignation to a 
societal status quo of endemic opportunity deficits 
controlled by a cabal. 
I turn now to the analysis of the meaning of qāt in 
Yemeni society, which is the preserve of scholars of 
the culturalist school who insist on privileging the 
epiphenomal aspects of the qāt consumption practice. 
This has misled them into an interpretive impasse in 
which the culture of qāt chewing is seen primarily 
through the prism of identity construction and tradition 
preservation. The fact is that, “patterns of consumption 
reflect and recreate the structures of social life… and 
are less a manifestation of individual consumer 
choices” [11]. Moreover, the structural configuration of 
social life is contingent on the society’s historical 
evolution, which in turn transforms the purpose and/or 
signification of the polity’s consumption practices. 
Indeed, qāt epitomizes the notion of a commodity 
having a “semiotic virtuosity”, given its historically 
contingent “capacity to signal fairly complex social 
messages” [2]. In the case of qāt consumption in 
Yemeni society, it has undergone the following 
“semiotic” transitions since the fourteenth century to the 
present: Ancient medicinal concoction to restore the 
balance in the body’s humors; an aide to an individual 
or collective spiritual quest as part of a clerical 
devotional ritual; a muse to poetic and artistic creativity 
and enabler of intellectual productivity; a solvent of 
                                            
27 This is partly evident in the fact that “Yemen’s civil service… 
accounts for nearly one-quarter of the government’s current 
expenditure, one of the highest levels in the Middle East and North 
Africa region” [6]. Moreover, according to local reports, every 
government ministry is allocated a budgetary category entitled 
“allowances, grants, and social benefits”, which is to be used at the 
discretion of the minister as “financial transfers to non-government 
employees.”  
social taboos regarding status distinction and class 
hierarchy; a medium of political mobilization; a symbol 
of national cultural identity; a conduit to a hedonistic 
conviviality; and currently the social opiate of the 
national polity. In this light, practitioners of the 
culturalist school need to abandon their romantic 
assessment of the qāt chewing practice, which is 
tantamount to defending the qātlords lobby, and come 
to the realization that the habitual use of qāt by a 
majority of the public is, in effect, an act of surrender to 
the state’s fomentation of a politically disengaged 
citizenry in collusion with the qātlords lobby’s 
reproduction of a psychoactive substance-abusing 
population. The fact is qāt chewing is a “habit that 
leaves the [political and economic] status quo alone” 
[67], as the polity hibernates daily in mini assemblies of 
discursive conviviality while “building castles of spit.”  
In the light of the above diagnosis, what is to be 
done by Yemenis for their society to break out of its 
post-traditional trap, and for the Yemeni polity to 
abandon its qāt dependency? This article has focused 
on the nature of the state and its historical mutation 
due to changing political and economic exigencies 
compelling its policies, the constraining influence of the 
traditional socio-political forces on the state’s policy 
prerogatives, the exacerbating effects on the polity’s 
qāt consumption habit, and the multiple consequences 
on the society as a whole. Accordingly, I highlight four 
core infrastructural challenges entailed by the above 
analysis, which shift the policy focus from addressing 
symptoms, as in the case of demand reduction, to 
tackling the causes in terms of supply reduction. They 
represent the ultimate endpoints of any strategy that 
seeks to recalibrate the role of qāt in Yemeni society: 
Engineering the demise of tribal hegemony:  
The renegotiation of the state-tribe covenant that 
has framed Yemen’s governance and dictated the 
state’s operational logic since the end of the civil war in 
1970 in North Yemen, which disabled the central 
government, undermined the emergence of a viable 
civil society, and has constituted ever since a financial 
burden on the nation.28 Breaking the tribes’ hegemony 
                                            
28 It is worth noting that the Hūthīs’ choice for the de facto head 
of state of Yemen after their September 2014 coup d’état is a 
professional qāt seller (muqawwit). This selection represents a 
political olive (or qāt) branch to the qātlords lobby as a guarantee of 
unhampered production of qāt, and heralds the continuing political 
and economic dominance of Yemen’s traditional forces; thus making 
a mockery of the stated rationale for their coup, namely the 
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is a sine qua non to reducing the influence of the 
qātlords lobby over the state’s policy priority, and to 
putting an end to their military autonomy and protection 
racketeering vis-à-vis the government [68]. For this 
step to succeed it must be pursued simultaneously with 
the detribalization and professionalization of the army. 
This would remove a major impediment to the overdue 
process of reconfiguring state-society relations. 
Establishing a functioning administration:  
The re-configuration of the state’s bureaucracy 
through the formalization of its institutions and the 
elimination of shadow parallel governance structures; 
the rationalization of center-periphery administrative 
relations; the rehabilitation of the bureaucracy’s 
functional relevance to the society as a whole; and the 
strengthening of its fiscal extraction capability vis-à-vis 
the qāt economy, which may eventually replace the oil 
economy, given its diminishing reserves, as the state’s 
principal source of fiscal revenue.  
Re-imagining a public ethos:  
The secular moralization of the public sphere that 
has been vacated by the clerical class who not only 
represents the first line of defense against the critique 
of qāt consumption, but also constitutes a religious 
bulwark against the de-traditionalization of Yemeni 
society. This secular morality could be pursued through 
the cultivation of a new civic consciousness by the new 
generation with zero tolerance for the culture of 
corruption and for the pervasive ethos of mediocrity 
engendered by the culture of qāt chewing, which has 
bred a chronic insouciance vis-à-vis the nation’s 
civilizational fate.  
Fomenting a new social imaginary:  
The promotion and valorization of the nation’s 
varied regional cultural formations in order to diversify 
the repertoire of cultural activities available to the 
national polity, and thus mend its regional fissures. This 
is to be complemented by the fostering of an 
                                                                          
completion of the Yemeni youth’s Arab Spring revolution. It is most 
significant that in spite of Yemen’s war ravaged landscape and the 
humanitarian catastrophe that afflicts its people, qāt remains widely 
available. Finally, this widely derided selection of a practitioner of a 
traditionally low status occupation as head of state violates the basic 
guiding principle of the Hūthīs, as members of the sāda class, in 
selecting their political leaders: īkhtīyār al-āfdhal ‘ala al-mafdhūl (“to 
choose the best over the better”).  
extroverted cultural curiosity about, and active 
intellectual engagement with, the larger world – East 
and West – which the hegemony of the qāt chewing 
culture’s provincialism has discouraged. This would 
renew the polity’s political and cultural emancipatory 
aspiration as was the case with the Free Yemeni 
Movement under the Imamate.  
These are the ineluctable challenges that must be 
confronted in order to rekindle the “cultural struggle” 
against the forces of traditionalism that the pioneers of 
Yemen’s modernization launched nearly a century ago, 
and thus reclaim the abandoned emancipatory 
promises of the earlier revolutions; and in the process 
re-launch Yemen’s Arab Spring whose aspiration 
toward societal transformation was compromised by 
the opportunistic patronage of the same forces of 
traditionalism (i.e., the tribes, the army, the Sunnī 
Islamists, and more recently Shī‘a tribal militias) that 
undermined the modernist aspirations of an earlier 
generation of revolutionaries. 
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